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Abstract
A great deal of attention has been paid in the literature to estimating the impacts of training
programs. Much less attention has been devoted to how training agencies assign participants to
training programs, and to how these allocation decisions vary with agency resources, the initial
skill levels of participants and the prevailing labor market conditions. This paper models the
training assignment problem faced by welfare agencies, deriving empirical implications regard-
ing aggregate training policies and testing these implications using data from Welfare-to-Work
training programs run by California counties during the 1990s. I ￿nd that county welfare agen-
cies do not seem to follow a simple returns-maximization model in their training assignment
decisions. The results show that, as suggested by political economy models, the local political
environment has a strong e⁄ect on training policies. In particular, I ￿nd that going from a
Republican to a Democratic majority in a county￿ s Board of Supervisors has a strong e⁄ect on
training policies, signi￿cantly increasing the proportion of welfare recipients receiving human
capital development training.
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Manpower training programs seek to reduce unemployment and poverty by increasing work-related
skills, human capital and the employability of the poor and disadvantaged. For a long time a
great deal of attention has been paid in the literature to estimating the impacts, or returns, to
these programs. The issue confronting these evaluations, however, is how to address the bias that
results from non-random assignment of who gets trained and what type of training they receive.
In recent years there has been increasing interest in understanding the processes, or decision rules,
governing these choices, in particular as they relate to the roles of governmental agencies, program
administrators and caseworkers.
This paper contributes to understanding the assignment decision rules, of government agencies
by using data for Welfare-to-Work (WTW) training programs run by counties in California during
the 1990s. In 1996, the U.S. welfare system underwent a major reform with the passage of the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). One of the key
features of the new system was to require that welfare recipients enroll in one or more training
or work-related activities, under WTW programs, as a condition of receipt of this temporary
assistance.1 Within these WTW programs, training is typically classi￿ed into two types: 1) labor
force attachment (LFA) programs that provide welfare recipients with training and assistance in
￿nding jobs; 2) human capital development (HCD) programs that seek to develop basic and work-
oriented skills.2
In this paper I seek to understand the decisions made by the agencies that run these programs;
in particular, who these programs/agencies train and, more importantly, which type of training they
provide to speci￿c participants. I pay special attention to the role played by resource constraints,
local economic conditions, and the characteristics of the served individuals. In addition, I analyze
the often overlooked role of the political environment of the counties in shaping the programs￿
decisions.
The literature on the decision process behind training programs has primarily focused on two
aspects. First, a recent literature has focused on the role of caseworkers in the assignment to
training decisions, and their interaction with statistical pro￿ling or targeting systems. The evidence
1Note that having a requirement for welfare recipients to participate in training or work-related activities was not
new to PRWORA. Since the 1960s, the U.S. welfare system, under the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC) program, included requirements for participation in employment and training programs by non-exempted
welfare recipients. But these provisions were not consistently enforced. The current federal legislation contains
stronger mandates and incentives for states to comply with these provisions, especially the participation in work-
related activities. Some states even merged the operations of their welfare recipients-related employment and training
operation with those for non-welfare recipients established by the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) of 1998, which
replaced the Job Training Partnership Act (JTPA). That is not the case for California in the period analyzed, and
thus this paper will only address the services provided to welfare recipients.
2For evaluations of the e⁄ects of a series of 1990s LFA and HCD programs, see Bloom and Michalopoulos (2001)
and Hotz, Imbens and Klerman (2006). Dyke, Heinrich, Mueser, Troske and Jeon (2006) conduct an analysis of more
recent WTW programs.
1suggests that caseworkers are not very good at attaining the most e¢ cient allocation of potential
trainees to types of training (Lechner and Smith, 2007) and that they do not necessarily improve
the allocation, even when o⁄ered statistical predictions of the best possible treatment for their
clients (Behncke, Fr￿lich and Lechner, 2007). This suggests that caseworkers may have their own
objectives or may be responding to other objectives in their organizations (and to directives from
supervisors). Indeed, Bloom, Hill and Riccio (2003) and Hill (2006) show that the speci￿c details
of program implementation and the caseworker job design matter in the allocation decision (and
for client outcomes).3
This paper takes a di⁄erent approach than the studies on the role of caseworkers by focusing
on the overall decisions made at the county level. The disadvantage of this approach is that it
cannot identify the speci￿c role of caseworkers in the decision-making process. However, it has
the advantage of taking into account all the factors that a⁄ect the allocation decisions, including
the role of resource constraints (normally not taken into account in the caseworker studies), the
characteristics of the whole cohort of potential trainees (not just those under the responsibility of
particular caseworkers), and the in￿ uence of the local political environment.
A second strand of the literature concentrates on the modeling and empirical estimation of the
e⁄ects of incentives and performance standards on the decisions of those public sector organizations
that provide training.4 The conclusions from this strand of the literature are that performance
standards do a⁄ect the decisions of program administrators (e.g. Heckman, Heinrich and Smith,
2002) and that those responses are sometimes not intended, with administrators engaging in gaming
responses (e.g. Courty and Marschke, 1997 and 2004) and ￿cream-skimming￿ (Heckman et al.,
2002; Bell and Orr, 2002). During the period I analyze, counties in California were not subject
to any binding performance standards.5 Thus, I do not study the potential e⁄ects of performance
standards on assignment to training decisions. However, as Courty, Heinrich and Marschke (2005)
note, the practical implementation of performance standards in training programs is a complex
principal-agent issue, being hampered by, among other factors, the presence of multiple principals
3A related literature addresses statistical pro￿ling, by which individuals are assigned to programs based on pre-
dicted outcomes or program impacts (e.g. Manski, 2000 and 2004; Berger, Black and Smith, 2001; Dehejia, 2005).
Pro￿ling mechanisms seek to eliminate discretion in the assignment decisions. As Berger et al. (2001) show, they
require a clear de￿nition of the objective function and appropriate design of the pro￿ling mechanism to be e⁄ective.
4See Dixit (2002) for an overview of the issues surrounding incentives in organizations in the public sector. See
Eberts, Hollenbeck and Stone (2002), Hoxby (2002), and Koretz (2002) regarding education policies. Regarding
training policies, see Courty and Marschke (1997 and 2004), Dehejia (2005), Heckman, Smith and Taber (1996),
Heckman, Heinrich, and Smith (1997 and 2002), and Pepper (2002 and 2003).
5Under California￿ s TANF there was a provision by which certain savings which resulted from the recipients￿
exits and improved outcomes would be paid by the state to the counties as performance incentives. This rule was
implemented in the last period of this study, ￿scal year 1998-1999, when counties claimed a very small fraction of the
savings for spending (LAO, 2000). In addition, federal participation requirements were not binding either because
caseload reduction ￿credits￿were big enough to make them not binding (see LAO, 2002). A (￿nancial) bene￿t for
California of the participation requirements being e⁄ectively not binding was that the amount necessary to satisfy
the Maintenance-of-E⁄ort (MOE) requirement introduced by TANF was reduced by $130 millions per year (LAO,
2000).
2and agents. In this context it can still be important to identify the factors that a⁄ect the aggregate
decisions of local program administrators and agencies in the absence of performance standards, to
inform the appropriate implementation of such standards, and the expected results from them.6
In addition, this paper makes a contribution to a recent literature on the role of local political
variables in the design and implementation of Welfare-to-Work programs. Keiser, Mueser and Choi
(2003) and Fording, Schram and Soss (2006, 2007 and 2008) show how the political environment
and local political ideology a⁄ects the rates of sanctioning of welfare recipients under the TANF
program (with higher sanctioning rates associated to a more conservative political environment).
Moreover, Fording et al. (2006) rely on cross-county variation in a measure of local political ideology
in Florida, to ￿nd that the e⁄ect of performance standards and performance feedback on sanctioning
rates are also in￿ uenced by the political environment. They ￿nd that more conservative regions
react to performance feedback with a much higher sanctioning rate than do liberal regions. This
type of e⁄ect highlights the relevance of incorporating measures of the local political environment
in the analysis of the assignment-to-training decisions.
My analysis begins by modeling welfare agencies as a central planner that assigns workers to
di⁄erent types of training, including a no-training option, so as to maximize the returns to its
investments subject to a budget constraint and to the costs of alternative types of training. This
￿returns-maximization￿model of how training programs operate characterizes a ￿utilitarian￿view
of the objectives of government agencies (because it implies the maximization of the present value
of the participants￿outcomes) and is a natural place to begin to study agency/program decision-
making. This is similar to the model of Heckman et al. (2002) who analyze how agencies respond
to the imposition of performance standards.
A disadvantage of this aggregate returns-maximization model, is that it does not take into
account the principal-agent relationships between managers and caseworkers, nor does it considers
the ground-level functioning of the whole system, which could generate a very di⁄erent set of
aggregate preference functions. However, I believe this model serves as a useful benchmark in
guiding the empirical exercise. Using this model, I derive testable implications for the training
choices of agencies, which take into account the skills-heterogeneity of the participants, the e⁄ect
of a binding budget constraint on the agency, and the role local market conditions play.
Next, I consider the e⁄ects of the political environment at the county level on aggregate training
policies. As Fording et al. (2007) point out, the e⁄ect of the local political environment may be
exerted in several ways, through the actions of local policy makers, administrators and caseworkers,
6Starting in 1999, after the period of analysis used in this paper, the federal government implemented a small
performance standards program, the High Performance Bonus (HPB) which accounted for less than 1% of TANF￿ s
funding and was to be divided among states that satis￿ed certain standards (Wiseman, 2004). California received a
total of $123 million due to the HPB, from 1999 to 20001; less than 0.2% of its TANF￿ s budget in the period. From
2002 to 2005, it received even less, a total of $34 million (CDSS, 2005). Given the small amounts involved, and the
fact that individual counties had no stakes in obtaining HPB awards, it is hard to expect any behavioral responses
of individual counties to the HPB.
3or advocacy groups. Since the oversight of welfare agencies is conducted by elected o¢ cers, a
political economy model suggests that public opinion and the beliefs of the median voter should
a⁄ect the assignment to training policies.7 As is well documented in various types of polling
data, citizens often have strong views about people on welfare, the appropriateness of having a
welfare system and what types of bene￿ts and services people on welfare should receive.8 Also,
political parties and quasi-public organizations (e.g., unions and special interest groups) often
maintain explicit positions, or platforms, regarding the structure of welfare programs.9 Lastly,
welfare agency administrators and caseworkers may develop their own independent objectives for
how their programs are run and which individuals should be served.10
To capture the local political environment as it relates to the welfare program, I collected a
unique dataset with the party a¢ liation of the members of each county￿ s Board of Supervisors.11
The Board of Supervisors is the body that governs each county in California, applying state law
and public policy. It has both legislative powers (it pass ordinances) and executive powers (it
has the authority to appoint and remove department heads, and oversees the day-to-day county
operations). Therefore, the Boards can determine welfare policies on a county-wide basis. In this
study, the party composition of these elected Boards is used as a proxy measure for the overall
political environment in the county with regard to the welfare program, and not only as a measure
of the political or ideological leanings of the supervisors.
As noted above, I conduct my empirical analysis using county-level panel data for the WTW
programs in California.12 California is a well suited state for the application because it runs a very
decentralized welfare system in which individual counties have great latitude over which training
schemes they o⁄er and how they assign welfare recipients across these programs. Also, as is shown
below, there is a great deal of diversity across California￿ s counties in their pool of welfare recipients
and their labor market conditions throughout the 1990s.
The empirical analysis focuses on how the proportions of welfare recipients that received three
types of treatment￿ no training, labor force attachment training and human capital development
training￿ vary as a function of the budgets they receive from the State to run the welfare program,
the characteristics of their welfare recipients and indicators of the local labor market conditions
prevailing in the county. I ￿nd that counties determine their training policies based on those factors
7There is a debate in the literature on whether politicians respond to public opinion or just to their beliefs and
those of their supporters. See Jacobs and Shapiro (2002) and Erikson, MacKuen and Stimson (2002).
8See Kluegel and Smith (1986), Cook and Barrett (1992), Bean and Papadakis (1998) and Weaver (2002).
9See Kluegel and Smith (1986) and Cook and Barrett (1992).
10Evidence on the e⁄ects of preferences of caseworkers is presented by Heckman et al. (1996). Keiser et al. (2003)
and Fording et al. (2006, 2007 and 2008) show how the racial composition of a location, interacted with the political
environment can a⁄ect the policies towards di⁄erent racial groups. Also, see Ricucci (2005) for evidence on the impact
of the discretionary power of street-level bureaucrats.
11Supervisors are elected in California in non-partisan races, which implies that their party a¢ liation is not readily
available. See Section 4 for details on how the party a¢ liation information was obtained.
12As it is explained in Section 2, during the period analyzed (1994-1999) training for AFDC and TANF recipients
in California was o⁄ered through the GAIN and WTW programs, respectively.
4in ways that appear to be consistent with a simple returns-maximization model. However, when
incorporating the e⁄ects of local political factors into the empirical model, I ￿nd that a simple
returns-maximization model is not su¢ cient to characterize the observed assignment decisions of
county welfare agencies. In particular, I ￿nd that switching from a Republican to a Democratic
majority in the county Board of Supervisors has a strong e⁄ect on training policies, signi￿cantly
increasing the proportion of welfare recipients receiving human capital development training.
These results are important because they suggest that the assignment to treatment decisions
re￿ ect a complex interaction between the many agents involved in the determination of training
policies and the political environment. This should be taken into account in the implementation
and design of performance standards. More importantly, the results raise e¢ ciency concerns about
the assignment-to-training policies. Although this has been a contentious issue, there seems to be
an emerging consensus in the literature that human capital development programs are preferred in
the long-run over labor force attachment programs (e.g. Hotz, Imbens and Klerman, 2006; Dyke,
Heinrich, Mueser, Troske and Jeon, 2006). Thus if HCD programs are less favored by counties with
Republican Boards, this could have important negative consequences for the long-run outcomes of
the welfare recipients living in those areas.
The paper is organized in seven sections. The next section describes the WTW training pro-
grams for welfare recipients in California, and shows the evolution over time of the two types of
training. The third section presents the optimization problem faced by a welfare o¢ ce that tries to
maximize the expected outcome from its training policies and derives the empirical implications of
such a problem. It also discuss the extension of the basic model to allow for e⁄ects of local political
factors. The fourth section presents the county-level and individual data to be used in the empirical
analysis. The ￿fth section describes the empirical strategy, which entails estimating measures of
the distribution of observable and unobservable characteristics of welfare entrants, as a ￿rst step,
and estimating multinomial logit regressions using the county-level data on training policies in a
second step. The sixth section presents the results, while the seventh section concludes.
2 The GAIN and WTW programs
Training was o⁄ered to welfare recipients in California in the 1990s through two programs. Cal-
ifornia￿ s version of the Job Opportunity and Basic Skills (JOBS) program,13 under the Aid for
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) program, was the Greater Avenues for Independence
(GAIN) program, in which training was the main component. It started in 1989 and was succeeded
in 1998 by the Welfare to Work (WTW) program, as part of the California Work Opportunity and
13JOBS was intended to help families on welfare avoid long-term welfare use, by providing job search assistance,
education, work experience, vocational training, and other employment-related services, and required all parents
(except those with small children) to participate in these work-related activities or face a reduction in the amount of
assistance received (Haveman and Wolfe, 2000).
5Responsibility to Kids (CalWORKs) program, California￿ s version of the Temporary Assistance for
Needy Families (TANF) program.14 Both programs o⁄ered di⁄erent types of services to welfare
recipients who were required to participate (except parents of small children), or face ￿nancial
sanctions. However, under GAIN counties faced severe funding constraints, and in some counties
a large fraction of the caseload remained not served.
Under CalWORKs every adult is required to participate in the WTW program, which implied
that counties had to expand their programs to accommodate all the adult caseload.15 The activities
that the programs o⁄ered included, among others, job search and job readiness assistance, on-the-
job training and subsidized employment, vocational education training, adult basic education,
English as a second language, and classes for preparing to take the General Education Diploma
(GED) exam.
The training activities are classi￿ed in two groups: 1) those that are work-oriented, which are
termed Labor Force Attachment (LFA) programs; and 2) those that are education-oriented which
are termed Human Capital Development (HCD) programs. Typically, LFA training is shorter
in duration and less expensive to provide than HCD training (see Hamilton et al., 2001 for a
discussion of both approaches).16 For some analyses, HCD training is divided further into Adult
Basic Education (ABE) and Vocational Education (VOC), which can be considered as more basic
and advanced respectively.17
Counties in California were given a great degree of freedom in designing their GAIN and WTW
programs. This caused remarkable variation, both across counties and across time in the proportion
of the adult caseload that participated in any activity, and that participated in LFA- and HCD-
types of training. The cross-county variation from 1994 through 1999 in the proportion of adults
receiving the two types of training is presented in Figure 1. Each circle represents a county; their
size is proportional to the size of the adult welfare caseload.18 The 45o line represents the case
14TANF replaced AFDC after the passage of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act (PRWORA) in 1996. California was the last state to implement TANF, starting in January 1998 under the
CalWORKs name.
15However, participation in the WTW program does not necessarily imply that a recipient received training services.
There are non-training activities that count as participation in the WTW program (e.g., participation in substance
abuse help programs).
16The Labor Force Attachment (or Work First) type of programs try to increase the insertion of welfare recipients
into the labor force by providing job search training and assistance, while the Human Capital Development type of
programs are directed to increase the trainees￿human capital by o⁄ering basic skills and vocational training programs
that are longer in duration.
17VOC re￿ ects vocational education training activities, while ABE re￿ ects adult basic education, English as a second
langauge and GED-related activities. HCD activities are the sum of VOC and ABE. LFA activities include job club,
supervised job search, short- and long-term preparation, alternative work experience, on-the-job-training, subsidized
and transitional employment and other job search activities. Unsubsidized employment is not considered a training
activity, even though it does count as ￿participation in a WTW program￿ for federal participation requirements
under TANF.
18This paper covers the period January 1994-June 1999; after June 1999 a new reporting system for the WTW
program (WTW25) was implemented by the state of California which was not fully functional until 2000. Because
the comparability of the data from WTW25 with the data from the original reporting system (GAIN25) is far from
clear, only the data from GAIN25 is used in this paper.
6where the sum of the proportions of both types of training is equal to one, and everybody is trained.
Thus, the ￿gure shows an increasing proportion of individuals trained in general over time, but is
more marked for LFA training. When the CalWORKs program started (January 1998), there was
a larger jump in LFA training than in HCD training. However, in relative terms, the increase was
larger in HCD training.
Note that the ￿gure presents data for all the adults on welfare corresponding to a particular
period of time. Unfortunately, there is no data available that divides the fraction of recipients
between new entrants and non-entrants to welfare. The theoretical model and empirical analysis
will be based, however, on the characteristics of new entrants to welfare, because their assignment
to treatment is a well de￿ned problem.19 Moreover, both the GAIN and WTW programs (with
more emphasis in the latter) were devised such that each new entrant to welfare was assessed and
assigned to a treatment in a relatively short period of time. However, under the GAIN program,
counties in which the available resources did not permit the treatment of a large percentage of the
caseload had long waiting lists. This is re￿ ected in a ￿no training￿category, which will be explicitly
modeled in the next section.20
3 The assignment to treatment decision
In Section 3.1 I present a simple returns-maximization model for the decision making process of a
county￿ s welfare agency that has to assign welfare recipients to di⁄erent treatment alternatives, and
characterize testable implications with respect to the e⁄ects of changes in the budget constraint, in
local economic conditions and in the initial skills distribution of the welfare entrants. In Section 3.2
I discuss how the basic model can be extended to allow for a role of the local political environment. I
suggest an interpretation in which the welfare agency has a richer set of preferences over participants
than implied by the simple returns-maximization model, for example across types of training or
across individuals with di⁄erent initial skills. These preferences can arise from the aggregation of
preferences of the di⁄erent stakeholders, for example through the policy and local political process.
I show that these preferences can lead to di⁄erent assignment decisions than those that result from
returns-maximization.
3.1 The returns-maximization model
As discussed in the introduction, the centralized view of the decision process sidesteps, by con-
struction, the consideration of any agency issues. To make explicit that the decision maker here is
19An alternative decision problem, in which the county has to decide the assignment to treatment for a welfare
recipient conditional on her (potentially) having already received training before would be much more complex to
analyze.
20The ￿no training￿ treatment may imply that if the individual stayed long enough on welfare, she could have
eventually received some training services, even though that did not happen if the individual was a new entrant.
7aggregating all stakeholders in the decision-making process, I will refer to the decision maker simply
as the ￿county.￿The hypothesis of the returns-maximization model is that the county￿ s objective is
to maximize the expected returns from its training policies. This seems like a natural starting point,
given that it re￿ ects the view that the county￿ s objective is to obtain the best possible outcomes in
the labor market for the welfare recipients: to help them become self-su¢ cient. Furthermore, this
objective function is the same as that assumed by Heckman et al. (2002), Dehejia (2005), Manski
(2000, 2004) and Pepper (2002, 2003).21
Heckman et al.￿ s model (2002) is similar to the one below, in particular, because it includes
a budget constraint, which other studies do not take into account.22 Additionally, their model
allows the decision maker to choose the level of training e⁄ort exerted for each individual, which in
some sense is similar to the problem in this paper in which the county has to choose among three
treatment options that imply di⁄erent ￿intensities￿of training. The contribution of the model in
this paper is to show how the decisions of the county regarding the two training options can be
used to empirically test the implications of alternative objectives that govern agencies￿assignment
decisions.
Setup Assume a county needs to make training decisions for an entering cohort of welfare re-
cipients. Each individual￿ s characteristics, which are denoted by a random vector Xi, include her
demographic information, educational attainment, previous employment and earnings histories,
and, in some cases, evaluations (either objective or subjective) made by county o¢ cers on the
individual￿ s potential.23 I assume that this information is aggregated by the county in a single-
dimension index ￿ = !(Xi), where ! is a known weighting function. Furthermore, I assume that
this index is continuous, that it takes on values in the interval [￿;￿], and that it follows a county-
speci￿c probability distribution function, f(￿). I assume that the ability to generate earnings, or
to ￿nd employment, is positively correlated with ￿, which can be interpreted as a measure of an
individual￿ s initial skills level. I will subsequently refer to ￿ simply as skills.
The county has three treatment options for each individual: 1) to not provide any training
services (treatment N); 2) to provide LFA training services (treatment L); or 3) to provide HCD
training services (treatment H). The county evaluates the e⁄ect of each treatment option on an
individual with skills ￿, by looking at the outcome variable Y (￿). This variable can represent
di⁄erent outcomes of interest for the county (e.g., earnings, or the probability of ￿nding a job).
Treatments N, L and H have associated, at each period, outcome generating functions Y N(￿),
Y L(￿) and Y H(￿), respectively. The outcome functions for treatments L and H can also be rewritten
21However, Dehejia also incorporates uncertainty regarding the distribution of outcomes, and allows for a social
welfare function that exhibits inequality aversion.
22Pepper (2003) does consider an optimization model subject to a budget constraint, as one possible source of
identi￿cation of the potential e⁄ects of WTW polices.
23Some elements of the vector Xi will be observed and some will not be. This issue will be discussed in further
detail in Section 5.
8as Y L(￿) = Y N(￿)+￿L(￿) and Y H(￿) = Y N(￿)+￿H(￿), where ￿L and ￿H represent the treatment
e⁄ects of training L and H, respectively, and they are assumed to be non-negative functions of ￿.24
Because training takes time, the present value of the outcome under treatment N could be
higher than the present value of the outcome under treatment L, or treatment H for that matter,
for some values of ￿. I assume that each individual, at the time of treatment, has a future labor life
of T periods (￿xed). Treatment L takes place over ￿L > 0 periods, while training H takes place
over ￿H > 0 periods. Therefore, as HCD training takes longer than LFA training, this implies that
￿H > ￿L.
The expected present value of the future stream of bene￿ts (in each period t) associated with
receiving treatment i is represented by the bene￿t functions V i(￿) =
PT
t=￿i ￿tE[Y i
t (￿)], where ￿ is
the discount factor, i = N;L;H, and ￿N ￿ 0. To simplify the setup, I assume that the expected
outcome is constant over time, i.e. E[Y i
t (￿)] = E[Y i(￿)] for all t, which implies that the bene￿t
functions can be re-expressed as V i(￿) = ￿iE[Y i(￿)], where ￿i is a constant. Without loss of
generality it can be assumed that ￿ = 1, in which case ￿N = T, ￿L = T ￿ ￿L, and ￿H = T ￿ ￿H
(and it is easy to see that ￿N > ￿L > ￿H).25
Since the cost of training is borne by the county there is no direct cost of receiving training L
or training H for the individuals, other than the opportunity cost of attending such training. The
cost to the county associated with the provision of treatment N (no training) is normalized to zero,
i.e. cN ￿ 0. Thus, the county faces additional direct costs per person cL and cH associated with
the provision of treatments L and H respectively, where cH > cL, because HCD training is more
expensive than LFA training.26 Finally, the county has a ￿xed budget B which it must use to cover
the expenses associated with providing the training services.27
The county￿ s problem The county seeks to assign individuals to the di⁄erent treatments such
that it maximizes the expected returns to the investment. This problem implies that the county has
to assign a treatment for each individual. To make some progress, I impose minimal conditions on
the outcome generating functions Y N;Y L and Y H, that make the problem both analytically simpler
and, more importantly, informative in terms of the implications associated with the changes in the
economic environment faced by the county. Assuming that the outcome generating functions are
24However, note than the di⁄erential treatment e⁄ect ￿
L(￿) ￿ ￿
H(￿) can be positive or negative.
25Note that if ￿ < 1, then ￿N =
1￿￿T+1
1￿￿ , ￿L =
￿￿L￿￿T+1
1￿￿ , ￿H =
￿￿H ￿￿T+1
1￿￿ and it still holds that ￿N > ￿L > ￿H.
26Hamilton et al. (2001, pp. 308-309) show the ￿ve-year welfare-department portion of the costs of training
programs for several counties that participated in the National Evaluation of Welfare-to-Work Strategies (NEWWS).
For example, the costs for Riverside County (CA) were $2,217 and $3,284 for LFA and HCD training, respectively (in
constant 1999 dollars), while for Grand Rapids (MI) the corresponding costs where $1,610 and $2,288. However, there
were almost no cost di⁄erences for the programs in Atlanta (GA), $3,454 and $3,466 for LFA and HCD, respectively.
27In the model I abstract from the budget allocation process by which B is available to spend in training programs.
This simpli￿cation allows me to focus on the determination of training policies, given a budget. The potential
endogeneity of the allocation of resources to the training programs will be addressed, however, in the empirical
analysis.
9concave and satisfy a standard ￿single crossing￿property, which ensures that the bene￿t functions
cross at most once, the decision problem of the county is simpli￿ed greatly (the formal assumptions
are speci￿ed in the Appendix). This implies that the interaction of the functions V N(￿); V L(￿)￿cL
and V H(￿) ￿ cH divide the support of ￿, into (at most) three regions, in which all the individuals
belonging to a region receive the same treatment.
I denote these three regions over the distribution of ￿ as Rl (low), Rm (medium) and Rh (high),
and use the region subscript to denote the treatment provided in that region (i.e. l;m and h,
where each of them can assume values N;L or H). Thus, the county￿ s problem reduces to choosing
two critical values for ￿, that de￿ne the regions￿limits. Designating ￿l as the critical value that
separates regions Rl and Rm, and ￿h as the critical value that separates regions Rm and Rh, the
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s:t: F(￿l)cl + [F(￿h) ￿ F(￿l)] cm + [1 ￿ F(￿h)]ch ￿ B;
where cl, cm, or ch will assume the value 0 when valued at treatment N (i.e. cN ￿ 0).
The formulation of (P1) implies that the county only needs to set a decision rule based on
the two critical values; assignment to each treatment follows directly from this decision rule. This
allows me to study the e⁄ects of changes in the environment faced by the county welfare agency
simply by analyzing the e⁄ects on the critical values for ￿.
Solution The ￿rst and second order conditions for (P1) are presented in the Appendix. Depend-
ing on which type of individual bene￿ts more from each type of treatment, there are six possible
interior solutions. All these solutions imply that the support of the skills distribution is divided in
three region (low, medium, high skills), and a di⁄erent treatment is o⁄ered to the individuals who
fall in each region. Thus, I characterize those six cases by the treatment received by the individ-
uals in the regions of low, medium and high skills, in this order. Denoting them by the notation
[Rl;Rm;Rh], where the subscripts refer to the treatment, the cases are:
1. [RN;RL;RH] =) [No Training, Training L, Training H]
2. [RN;RH;RL] =) [No Training, Training H, Training L]
3. [RL;RN;RH] =) [Training L, No Training, Training H]
4. [RL;RH;RN] =) [Training L, Training H, No Training]
5. [RH;RN;RL] =) [Training H, No Training, Training L]
6. [RH;RL;RN] =) [Training H, Training L, No Training].
10Budget constraint Here there are two possibilities: If the county has enough funds, such that
the budget constraint is not binding, then the welfare agency provides training to all the individuals
for which the (net) returns to training are positive. The allocation between training L and training
H is determined by the marginal returns to each pair of treatments compared with the marginal
costs of treatment. Hence, inside each skill region the individuals receive the treatment with the
greater (net) bene￿t compared to the other two. Figure 2 depicts this situation, where panels 2.A
to 2.F display Cases 1 to 6 speci￿ed above.28
If the budget constraint is binding, it is easy to show that the county will choose the ￿l and
￿h that equalize the ratio of marginal bene￿ts to the ratio of marginal costs associated with the
treatments across regions. Hence, the county resorts to substituting between treatments until that
condition is satis￿ed. Note that the county no longer equates just private marginal bene￿ts with
private marginal costs, but now has to consider the ￿social￿cost implicit in the fact that providing
training to some individuals imply that training has to be denied to other individuals.
To describe exactly how the county attains the optimality condition consider Case 1 as an
example. Faced with a binding budget constraint, the county can train fewer people (with respect
to the unconstrained case); the issue is how to decide which individuals to train, and which training
to o⁄er them. There are two e⁄ects. First, because training H is the most expensive treatment, the
county chooses to o⁄er fewer people this treatment. As it is shown in Figure 2.A, the individuals
￿denied￿ treatment H (that is, individuals who in the unconstrained case would have received
training H) will be o⁄ered treatment L. But, as more and more individuals around ￿u
h are o⁄ered
treatment L instead of treatment H, the lost marginal bene￿ts of training increase (as measured
by the vertical distance between the curves V H(￿) ￿ cH and V L(￿) ￿ cL). Second, if the county
denies training to individuals that otherwise would have received treatment L, starting with the
individuals around ￿u
l , the lost marginal bene￿ts are also small at the beginning and increase as
more and more people are denied training. The new equilibrium critical values are represented
in the Figure by ￿c
l and ￿c
h and the shaded areas roughly indicate the lost ￿social￿ bene￿t of
substituting for one treatment or the other. Here, note that even if the county has equal concern
for every individual (weights them equally), it will choose not to o⁄er every individual her optimal
treatment option, because it takes into account the trade-o⁄ generated by the resource constraint.
Testable implications of the returns-maximization model The objective of the model is
to study how changes in its parameters a⁄ect the proportions of people trained (total and in each
28Note that if the individuals do take into account the direct costs of training, cL and cH, the solution is the same
as would be obtained in the decentralized problem where the individuals are allowed to choose the treatment strategy
themselves. For example, individuals could be o⁄ered ￿vouchers￿ , valid to use in any training of their choice, allowing
them to keep any di⁄erence between the value of the voucher and the cost of the training. In this way, they would
completely internalize the cost of training. As such, the model shares the essential features of the Roy Model of
self-selection in the labor market (Roy, 1951), in which heterogeneous agents self-assign themselves to occupations
according to a principle of comparative advantage (e.g., Willis, 1986; Heckman and Honore,1990).
11type of training). These proportions will be denoted in the remainder of the paper by PN, PL,
and PH for treatments N, L and H respectively. Note that PN ￿ 1 ￿ PT, where PT ￿ PL + PH
represents the total proportion of individuals receiving any type of training.
To study the changes in PN, PL, and PH it is clear that the key is to analyze the reaction of the
optimal critical values ￿c
l and ￿c
h (where the superscripts will be dropped in the rest of the paper
to simplify notation) to changes in the environment faced by the welfare agency.29 Of interest are
the e⁄ects of changes in the budget B, the e⁄ects of changes in a parameter vector ￿ that a⁄ects
the opportunity cost of training Y N(￿;￿), and the e⁄ect of changes in a parameter vector ￿ that
a⁄ects the distribution of skills F(￿;￿). In the Appendix I present the formal results, here I just
discuss the intuition associated with each.
The discussion above should make clear the testable implications for changes in the budget
constraint. If the budget increases, the total proportion of people not trained should decrease, and
the total proportion of people receiving training H (the more expensive treatment) should increase,
because these individuals are the ￿rst a⁄ected by the binding budget constraint. The e⁄ects on the
proportion of people receiving training L are ambiguous, however, depending on whether or not
training L was rationed (Cases 3 and 5, positive), or was being used as substitute for training H
(Cases 2 and 5, negative) or a combination of both (Cases 1 and 6, ambiguous).
Regarding the e⁄ects of changes in the opportunity cost of training, one could concentrate just
on Y N, the potential outcome under no training. If this potential outcome increases, with the
training e⁄ects held constant, then one would expect that the proportion of individuals trained
should decrease (PN would increase). How PL and PH change is more complex to analyze. Given
that the budget is ￿xed and that PN increases, with everything else held equal, the county has
a greater budget available for the people that are going to be trained. Given that training H is
always rationed, there should be a substitution of training L for training H (therefore making PL
decrease and PH increase). However, because training H is the training that takes longer to be
completed, the opportunity cost of this training with respect to training N increases more than for
training L, making training H less desirable. If this e⁄ect is big enough, then the substitution will
be from training H to training L, which in turn might even imply (if the savings are big enough,
given that training H is more expensive) that the increase in PL makes PN actually decrease. The
formal result is presented in the Appendix.
If the distribution of skills associated with a given cohort of individuals to be treated changes,
it would be useful to understand how the county would change its optimal decisions. This happens
to be a particularly di¢ cult issue to explore. In the Appendix I show, for two distributional
assumptions (Uniform and Normal), that the e⁄ects of changes in the distribution of skills are
ambiguous. The intuition is that depending on the (relative) cost of the treatment towards which
29The two critical values are enough to determine the proportions of each treatment: using the general notation
for Cases 1 through 6,the proportions are Pl = F(￿l), Pm = F(￿h) ￿ F(￿l), and Ph = 1 ￿ F(￿h).
12the distribution moves, the county might be able to increase the proportion of people receiving that
particular treatment, for the cheaper treatments, but not for the expensive treatments. Therefore,
changes that would be easy to analyze if the budget constraint was not binding, become extremely
complicated with a binding budget constraint. See the Appendix for details.
3.2 The role of the local political environment
The simple returns-maximization model assumes that only factors associated with returns to train-
ing enter the county￿ s decision-making process. However, there are reasons why this might not be
the case. As welfare agencies are public bureaucracies there are many ways in which their decisions
could re￿ ect other objectives that arise due to the interaction of the objectives and preferences of
the involved parties.
First, the general oversight of the welfare agencies is carried out by county supervisors, who are
elected o¢ cers and determine general policy guidelines, as well as appoint the agency managers. As
such, the managers￿preferences should re￿ ect the elected o¢ cers￿preferences. Second, the agency
managers and caseworkers might have their own preferences that will a⁄ect the agencies￿decisions.
Third, special interest groups (i.e. advocacy groups) might also in￿ uence the decisions of the county
welfare agency. Therefore, the combination of these factors might generate an aggregate objective
function that is a⁄ected by the local political environment. Although it would be interesting to
formulate a political economy model of the interactions between di⁄erent participants in the policy
and political process that give rise to the actual training policies pursued by welfare agencies, this
is beyond the scope of the current study. Instead, my approach, considering what is feasible from
the empirical point of view, is to take the political process as given and assume that it will be
re￿ ected in the aggregate objective function of the county (taken as a single unit).
The local political environment could be re￿ ected in di⁄erent ways in the objective function
of the county. For example, one could assume that the county has preferences for a particular
type of training. Alternatively, one could assume that the preferences are over particular types
of individuals or groups (i.e. based on skills, race/ethnicity, etc.). Empirically, given that only
aggregate data is available, it would not be possible to distinguish between these di⁄erent objective
functions. However, empirically, it is still possible to capture whether local political factors in￿ uence
the counties￿ assignment to training decisions. This can be used as evidence that the simple
returns-maximization model does not properly characterize the aggregate objective functions of
the counties, even if the exact alternative objective function is not properly identi￿ed.
In what follows I show how one such alternative objective function could a⁄ect the assignment
to training decisions, namely the case where the county has a preference for a particular type of
training. In the Appendix I present an alternative case, where the county has a preference for
13individuals in a particular position in the skills distribution.30
In the particular case of LFA and HCD training, it seems reasonable to assume that one of
the two types of training could be preferred. The two types of training represent two distinctive
approaches with di⁄erences that can be deemed philosophical. For example, Hamilton et al. (2001)
judge that there has been disagreement over which type of training should be used as the best way
of fostering the goal of self-su¢ ciency. They characterize the di⁄erences between LFA and HCD as:
￿[LFA training] emphasizes quick employment, re￿ ecting the belief that individuals can best build
their employability and improve their skills, eventually achieving self-su¢ ciency, through actual
work, even if their initial jobs are minimum wage and without fringe bene￿ts￿ , while ￿[HCD train-
ing] emphasizes initial investments in short-term education and, in some cases, training, re￿ ecting
the view that these investments will eventually enable individuals to obtain higher-wages, longer-
lasting jobs with health insurance coverage￿(Hamilton et al., 2001, pp. 4). Ideological attitudes
towards the role of work and education can also explain the preferences for one type of training or
another. In particular, the evidence shows that in the speci￿c case of training policies, and attitude
towards welfare reform in general, more liberal individuals favor an education-approach, and more
conservative individuals favor a work-￿rst approach (e.g. Nathan and Gais, 1998; Weaver, 2002).
In addition, these preferences could re￿ ect heterogeneity in the discount rates associated with the
bene￿ts of training by policy makers; it has been shown that LFA training bene￿ts are more im-
mediate, while HCD training bene￿ts appear more in the medium- and long-run (Hotz et al. 2006;
Dyke et al., 2006).
Introducing preferences for a particular type of training in the model, considers the case of a
county that cares about expected returns from the assignment to training policies, but also has
a preference for one type of training over the other. To make the notation simpler, suppose that
the shape of the outcome generating functions are such that lower skills individuals do not bene￿t
from training, middle skills individuals bene￿t from training L, and upper skills individuals bene￿t
from training H (Case 1 in the Section 3.1). Then, denoting by ￿ the weight (preference) given to






[V L(￿) ￿ V N(￿) ￿ cm]dF(￿)
+ (1 ￿ ￿)
Z ￿
￿h
[V H(￿) ￿ V N(￿) ￿ ch]dF(￿) (P2)
s:t: [F(￿h) ￿ F(￿l)] cL + [1 ￿ F(￿h)]cH ￿ B:
In the Appendix I show that under ￿moderate￿values of ￿ (i.e. such that both types of training
are still o⁄ered), the empirical implications regarding changes in the budget and opportunity costs of
30This would arise in a speci￿cation where the county￿ s objective function presents inequality aversion; this type of
objective function is proposed by Dehejia (2005). Heckman et al. (2002) also allow for the possibility in their model
that there are preferences for a particular group, that is not explained by returns to training.
14training of the returns-maximization model still hold. However, the optimal treatment proportions
change and are a⁄ected by ￿. The e⁄ects of ￿ are clear: higher preference for training L increases
PL and decreases PH and PN (see Proposition 3 in the Appendix). If the preferences for training
L are extreme (￿ is ￿large￿ ), then the testable implications of the returns-maximization model
regarding changes in budget and local economics conditions will not hold.
4 Data
The empirical analysis is based on county-level information, and on the aggregation at the county-
level of individual data on new welfare entrants. The data on training is constructed as quarterly
averages from published county-level monthly reports by every county in California on the number
of people participating in the GAIN and WTW programs, and in each of the activities of the
program.31 Based on these reports, the probabilities of training and participating in activities were
constructed.32 As it was mentioned in Section 2, the period under analysis is from 1994 Q1 to
1999 Q2. I use data for the 25 biggest counties in California, to assure that there is a minimum
number of entrants per quarter (at least 100 entrants per quarter). Table 1 presents statewide
and yearly averages of the county-level data that is used in the empirical exercises, while Table 2
presents county and year averages of the characteristics of the sample of entrants that are used in
the analysis.
To measure economic conditions at the county-level (as a proxy for the opportunity cost of
training), I use published unemployment rates, the employment to population ratio (total and in
di⁄erent sectors), and measures of average earnings for all and speci￿c employment sectors.33
A county￿ s budget is approximated by measures of its expenditures. Both the total expenditures
and those that measure only the costs associated with providing training services are available.
The budget for training is the variable suggested by the theoretical model, but is very likely to be
endogenous to the training policies followed by the counties. Therefore, I use the total expenditures
associated with running the welfare program (administrative, employment and training services and
child care), and do not include the costs of the actual cash aid provided to welfare recipients, as a
31As it was mentioned in Section 2, the data used is from the GAIN25 report (that covers the GAIN program
period and the ￿rst year and half of the WTW program).
32The monthly reports record the number of individuals participating in either the GAIN or WTW programs, and
the number of ￿activities￿ o⁄ered during the month. Potentially some individuals might participate in more than
one activity, which might imply that more activities are o⁄ered than people in the program. Thus, the proportions of
individuals in LFA and HCD training were calculated by summing up the activities in each category, dividing them
by the sum the total number of LFA and HCD activities, and then multiplying this proportion by the ratio of the
number of adults participating in the GAIN/WTW program to the total adult caseload in the corresponding month.
In a few cases (for small counties) this last ratio produced numbers slightly above one in value. In these cases the
ratios were rounded to equal one.
33The Bureau of Labor and Statistics (BLS) publishes the county-level unemployment rates, based on survey
methods. The employment and earnings measures are published by the California Employment and Development
Department (EDD) and BLS as part of the program known as ES-202 or Covered Employment and Wages.
15measure of the ￿resources￿available to the agencies.34
Finally, an important measure is the ￿political leaning￿of the county. The key elected o¢ cers,
in terms of decisions made at the county-level, are the members of the Board of Supervisors in each
county. These Boards have ￿ve members each, elected for four years, but with either two or three
seats up for election every two years. Each county is divided into ￿ve regions, and each region
elects one supervisor as its representative in the Board.35
The party a¢ liation of the members of the Board of Supervisors in each county is then a key
measure of the political leaning of the individuals making the actual policy decisions regarding the
county welfare program. In addition, how strongly tilted Republican or Democratic is a Board, may
re￿ ect the underlying local ideology in the county, which should be correlated with the ideology of
the welfare program administrators, caseworkers, and the strength of local advocacy groups.
A signi￿cant issue is that nominally Supervisor races are non-partisan. In reality, candidates
for the Board, in their great majority, do indicate their party a¢ liation in the campaigns and/or
are endorsed by the political parties. However, their party a¢ liation is not available in the public
records of the election results, nor in the county records of the composition of the Boards. To solve
this issue I collected a unique dataset with the names of all the members of the Boards of Supervisors
in the period under analysis, and matched these names (by county) with the records of Aristotle
International, a private company that sells access to voter registration records nationally. The
initial matching rate was 60%, but their records contained information that allowed the matching
rate to improve to over 70% (for example, by examining whether a particular person voted in the
election in which he or she was a candidate). For the 61 (out of 197) Supervisors for which the
voting registration records did not allow identifying uniquely party a¢ liation, a search was done
in newspaper databases, counties￿party web-sites and the web-sites of the supervisors to try to
identify the party a¢ liation. Using this method it was possible to identify the party a¢ liation for
all but four supervisors in California.
The individual-level data comes from two administrative datasets for the state of California
(MEDS and UI base wage ￿les) which provide some demographic and family information and
detailed monthly welfare use histories on every individual ever in the welfare system in California,
as well as quarterly earnings histories (before, during, and after welfare) for these individuals, as
long as their jobs are covered under the Unemployment Insurance system in California (around
90% of the employment of the State).36
34The data on expenditures comes from the County Financial Analysis Bureau at the California Department of
Social Services (CDSS). For each quarter the data corresponds to the quarter equivalent of the annual expenditures
in the corresponding ￿scal year.
35The only exception in the period analyzed was San Francisco County, which has merged the City Council and the
Board of Supervisors into one 11-member body. In the 1990s San Francisco￿ s 11 supervisors were elected in city-wide
elections. This changed starting in 2000, with elections being held by region.
36The MEDS (MediCal Eligibility Data System) dataset goes from 1987 to 2000 and contains the welfare use and
individual-level information; in addition, it is possible to use case-level data to construct proxies for measures of
family characteristics. The Unemployment Insurance (UI) base wage data goes from 1991 to 2000, and comes from
16Using the MEDS dataset, new entrants to welfare (de￿ned as individuals that enter welfare for
the ￿rst time as adults since January 1987) were identi￿ed. As mentioned above, only the 25 biggest
counties are analyzed; also some individuals were dropped from the analysis sample because they
had missing demographic information, or they belonged to a case which had characteristics that
did not allow to construct reliable family structure variables.37 An additional sample restriction
was that only adults 45 years old or younger are analyzed (because with older welfare recipients,
it is not clear how counties perceive the e⁄ectiveness of assigning them to training).38
5 Empirical strategy
The implications derived from the theoretical model in Section 3 can be tested empirically, using
the county-level data on the total proportions of people trained, and those receiving LFA and
HCD training, and the county-level variables presented in the previous section. The following two
subsections will detail the econometric speci￿cations used.
5.1 Estimation of skills distribution
As the model emphasizes, it is necessary to control for changes in the skills distribution of each
cohort of trainees to be able to compare county data across time and counties. Also, having a
measure of the skill distribution permits us to empirically evaluate the e⁄ects of changes in this
distribution on the counties￿average assignment to training rules.
The distribution of skills is unobservable for each cohort, at least from the point of view of
the econometrician. It is very likely that this is true for the county￿ s welfare agency too, but it
is also true that the agency (i.e. the caseworker dealing with a particular individual case) can
try to ￿learn￿ the value of ￿ for each individual that enters welfare, by di⁄erent means. One
piece of information is provided by the individual￿ s previous employment and earnings history, as
well as personal information (age, civil status, number of kids. age of kids, etc.) that should be
the quarterly reports ￿led by employers to the California Employment Development Department (EDD). For 1991
and 1992 this data is available only for a strati￿ed random sample of new entrants (representing approximately 35%
of all adult new entrants). Thus, employment and earnings information in years 2 and 3 before entry in Table 2 come
from those samples for entrants in 1994 and 1995. This is also why in the individual-level regressions in Appendix
Table A1, only 305,120 observations are used.
37Missing or invalid personal information refers primarily to SSN not valid, and/or missing date of birth, sex or
ethnicity. Also, because MEDS identi￿es cases, not families, it is necessary to be careful to identify cases that can be
credibly called ￿families￿ . The cases dropped were all cases in which more than one adult in FG or two adults in UP
cases received welfare, had more than two adults not receiving welfare, and had more than ￿ve children on welfare.
38In the 1994 Q1 through 1999 Q2 period there were 698,738 welfare entrants in California. Of those, 208,052
(29.8%) were dropped from the analyses because they had missing or invalid information or they were older than
45 years. In addition, 41,050 (8.3%) were dropped because they entered welfare in small counties where less than
100 people entered welfare per quarter. The analysis sample is then composed of 449,636 new entrants; half of them
are concentrated in a few counties (Los Angeles, Orange, Riverside, San Bernardino, San Diego, and Sacramento).
In addition to these, the following counties were included: Alameda, Butte, Contra Costa, Fresno, Imperial, Kern,
Madera, Merced, Monterey, San Francisco, San Joaquin, Santa Barbara, Santa Clara, Shasta, Solano, Sonoma,
Stanislaus, Tulare and Ventura
17very informative regarding the employability and earnings potential of the individual (which is
ultimately what ￿ tries to capture). Thanks to the individual-level data available on all the welfare
recipients in California, aggregate measures (at the entry cohort-county-level) of these variables
can be constructed and then used in the analyses.
A second piece of information on the underlying ￿ for the county is provided by the interac-
tion between the county (the caseworker) and the welfare entrant: all counties conduct one-on-one
interviews with every entrant to generate an assessment of her potential and weaknesses. In addi-
tion, many counties also conduct basic math and language exams to further inform this assessment.
Since there is no data on the results of these assessments, this is truly an unobservable from the
econometric analysis￿point of view (albeit observable for the county). It is also unobservable all
other information on the individual that the county observes but is not recorded in the data (most
notably educational attainment measures, unfortunately not available in the data sources). Finally,
there are some other factors (e.g., the individual￿ s motivation) which are not observed by the county
(unless the caseworker is able to gauge them in the personal interviews) or recorded in any data-set.
Let us assume that for an individual i, her skill level is ￿i = !X0
i, where Xi is a 1 ￿ K vector
of individual characteristics observed by the county, and ! is a 1 ￿ K (known) vector of weights
used by the county to aggregate this information. Furthermore, assume that Xi is partitioned into
two vectors, Xi = [Xo
i ;Xu
i ], where Xo
i is the vector of characteristics observed in the econometric
analysis, and Xu
i is the vector of characteristics that are unobserved in the econometric analysis.
Similarly ! can be partitioned as ! = [!o;!u].
Because the regressions of interest are at the county-level, it is necessary to introduce measures
of the characteristics of the distribution of ￿; for example by including in the county-level regressions
cohort/county means of the observed variables Xo. However, this has two limitations. First, the
coe¢ cients associated with these measures do not have a clear interpretation. Second, this strategy
leaves out Xu which might include very important factors in the county￿ s decision. Arguably,
Xo includes factors like employment and earnings histories that are considered as crucial in the
selection into training decision, by the training literature39; but other important factors used by
the county to make decisions, may be left out.
My strategy to address this problem is to use the individual-level information available for
welfare entrants to estimate an index for the left-out individual components, and then include
features of its distribution in the aggregate-level regressions. Speci￿cally, in the tradition of the
estimation of earnings equations literature, I calculate earnings equations for the welfare entrants
in a period prior to entry, and interpret the residuals from these regressions as measures of the
unobservable component of the skills of the individuals.
39The whole ￿selection on observables￿approach to the non-experimental literature of estimation of training e⁄ects,
is based on the assumption that a rich set of variables is available on the individuals, with earnings and employment
histories playing a central role.
18It is crucial then to obtain the best possible prediction of earnings. Given that a large proportion
of the individuals were not working before they entered welfare, there is a substantial mass at zero
earnings, and it is important to estimate the earnings equations in a way that explicitly deals with
this mass at zero
There are two usual approaches in the literature. One is to use a Heckman selection model where
the decision to participate in the labor force is estimated jointly with the log(earnings) equation.
The second is to use what is called a ￿two-part￿model, which models, in a ￿rst step, the labor
force participation decision, and in a second step the earnings-generating equation, conditional on
participation. There has been a debate in the literature over the merits of the two approaches,
in particular regarding prediction of E[Y jX], which is of main interest in this case (see Manning,
Duan and Rogers, 1987; Leung and Yu, 1996). The evidence weakly favors the two-part model
over the Heckman selection model on this basis (Leung and Yu, 1996). One of the issues is how
well the Heckman selection model deals with a particularly high mass at zero, as it is in this case;
over 50% of welfare entrants are not working before entry. There are two possible advantages in
that regard of the two-part model. First, it allows for distributional assumptions that are more
￿ exible than the Normal assumption; second, it allows for the estimation of the positive portion of
the earnings distribution in levels without having to take logs, and then convert back to levels to
obtain the predicted ^ Y for each individual (see Mullahy, 1998; Blough, Madden and Hornbrook,
1999; Manning and Mullahy, 2001).
Here, I estimate both a standard Heckman selection model, and a two-part model, to com-
pare the results. In the case of the Heckman selection model, the earnings equation is esti-
mated in logs, and the participation equation by a probit model. Then, for each individual
^ Yi = \ Pr(Yi > 0)exp(Xi^ ￿ + :5^ ￿), where ^ ￿ and ^ ￿ are estimated coe¢ cients from the log(earnings)
equation (Manning et al., 1987), and homoskedasticity is maintained.
For the two-part model, ￿rst the probability of earnings being positive is estimated with a
logit model; and second the earnings equation (for positive earnings only, in levels) is estimated
with a GLM model using a Gamma function and log link function. Then, for each individual,
^ Yi = \ Pr(Yi > 0)exp(Xi^ ￿), where ^ ￿ is the estimated coe¢ cient vector from the GLM estimation.
The main advantage of this two-part model speci￿cation is that it uses a Gamma function which
allows for a big mass at earnings close to zero, and it can be estimated under heteroskedasticity.
In both cases, after ^ Yi has been obtained, we can calculate the residual ui = Yi ￿ ^ Yi, which will be
the measure of the unobservable of the individual i.
Appendix Table A1 shows the results from estimating these two models. In the two-part model
the same variables were included in both stages of the estimation, while as it is usual for the
Heckman selection model, some exclusion restrictions were imposed (the excluded variables were
a dummy for a single parent family, a dummy for whether the individual received AFDC as a
child and four family-composition variables). In addition to the typical demographic and family
19variables, the models include employment history indicators and measures of local labor market
conditions.
Since the measure of unobservables is a proxy for relatively ￿permanent￿components in the
earnings generating function of each individual, I use as the dependent variable the sum of the
earnings observed for quarters 5 to 8 before ￿rst time of entry into welfare. Using, for example,
quarters 1 to 4 before entry would had implied capturing part of the income shocks that explain
entry into welfare in the ￿rst place (Ashenfelter￿ s dip). Alternative speci￿cations with di⁄erent
quarters before entry were tried, and as long as quarters 1 to 3 were not used, all the other cases
showed similar results. In addition, using four quarters together slightly diminished the issue of
zero earnings (compared to using single quarter measures). Note that the estimation was conducted
for all the cohorts of welfare entrants across all counties, which were pooled together, and including
county and quarter dummies as a way of obtaining a measure that is comparable across all counties
and time periods.
After the individual residuals are obtained, we investigate whether the estimated distributions
di⁄er across the two speci￿cations. A Spearman rank correlation coe¢ cient was estimated to be
0.902 between the two distributions, which suggests that they are both essentially capturing the
same features. Figure 3 makes the comparison more clear by plotting the relative position of each
individual, by deciles of the unobservables distribution, according to each method. The size of the
circles indicate the number of individuals in each point. The vast majority of the individuals are
in the 45o line, implying that both models classify them in the same decile, or are at most a decile
o⁄. For a small number of individuals, the two-part model tends to allocate them in higher deciles
than for the Heckman selection model (all those above the 45o line), while the opposite is true for
an even smaller number of observations. This is probably a re￿ ection of the two-part model being
able to better handle the mass of individuals at low earnings. In the next section, the unobservables
estimated from the two-part model will be used, although the results are not very sensitive if the
unobservables estimated with the Heckman selection model are instead used.
To understand the changes in the unobservables over time, Figure 4 presents the CDF of the
unobservables (from the two-part model) for the initial and ￿nal period in the analysis. The
unobservables are standardized to have a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one, and the
percentiles displayed in the ￿gure are the ones corresponding to the pooled distribution. The ￿gure
shows that from 1994 to 1999 a compression of the distribution of unobservables has occurred; the
percentage of individuals in 1999 that are in the 10th and 90th percentile of the pooled distribution
has decreased (this is true also for the 25th and 75th percentile). The question of interest here, of
course, is how did counties change their assignment to training decision in view of these movements
in the unobservables distribution?
205.2 County level regressions
The model presented in Section 3, provides testable implications on the e⁄ects of several variables
on the proportions of the di⁄erent treatments, PN, PL, and PH. This suggests estimating the
following three equations:
PN;ct = ￿0N+￿1NBct+￿2NEct+￿3NM^ U;ct+￿4NXct+￿5NZct+vN;ct (1)
PL;ct = ￿0L +￿1LBct +￿2LEct +￿3LM^ U;ct +￿4LXct +￿5LZct +vL;ct (2)
PH;ct = ￿0H +￿1HBct +￿2HEct +￿3HM^ U;ct +￿4HXct +￿5HZct+vH;ct (3)
where the subscripts c and t refer to county and time; PN;ct, PL;ct and PH;ct are respectively the
total proportion of people not trained, the proportion of people that received LFA training, and the
proportion of people that received HCD training; Bct represents the budget; Ect represents measures
of local economic conditions; M^ U;ct represents measures of the estimated unobservables distribution
for welfare entrants in county c at time t; Xct represents the average observed characteristics of the
welfare entrants in county c at time t; and Zct represents measures of the local political environment.
In addition county and time dummies are included in the equations, as a way to control for invariant
county- and time-speci￿c factors.
One option to estimate these equations would be to run linear regressions on the proportions
of the three treatments. However, this has the unattractive feature that the estimated proportions
could lay outside the (0,1) range. A better alternative is to estimate a multinomial logit model for
grouped data, where only two out of three equations are actually estimated; after the estimation,
marginal e⁄ects can be calculated for the three proportions.
An important issue in the estimation is choosing the appropriate measure of resources available
for training. The variable ￿training budget￿(see Table 2) is derived from the report of expenditures
of the counties on the training programs. Therefore, it is very likely that this variable will be
endogenous to the training policies of the counties. To deal with this issue I use instead the total
budget (expenditures) of the county. This seems to be a reasonable approximation for resource
availability, which should not be a⁄ected by endogeneity concerns with respect to the training
policies. In the period analyzed, the total county-level budget allocations to counties were decided
at the state-level by the California Department of Social Services, and therefore are exogenous to
the counties￿training policies.40
A second issue concerns to the (potential) endogeneity of the characteristics of new welfare
40For the 1994-1999 period analyzed in this paper, two di⁄erent budget allocation systems were in place in Cali-
fornia. From 1994 to 1997, the State essentially decided how much money would be allocated to di⁄erent programs
in each county, generating a situation where ￿county budgets re￿ ect state policy choices￿(LAO, 1996). From 1997
to 1999, budget allocation for employment and child care services, but not for administrative costs, was based on a
￿statewide model￿based on historical spending patterns (LAO, 2001). Under neither regimes, were budget alloca-
tions based on the training policies in the county. Starting in 2000, however, the budget allocation process changed
to better re￿ ect the county policy choices (LAO, 2002).
21entrants and training policies. There is evidence that individuals do respond strategically to changes
in welfare regulations (e.g., Grogger and Michalopoulos, 2003). The empirical speci￿cation controls
for measures of the unobservables distribution of welfare entrants, and includes county and time
dummies, which should allay concerns that the results are driven by unobservable heterogeneity
across counties or time. In addition, it is hard to argue that new entrants will apply to welfare
just because of the availability of training services; similar services are easily available outside the
welfare system, for example through the Workforce Investment Act (WIA) program, and the cash
component of welfare is likely to be the driving force in entry decisions. What would pose a problem,
however, is if counties actively used their training policies to discourage welfare entry. There is
evidence (e.g. Fording et al., 2006) that this type of behavior arises in response to welfare o¢ ces
failing (or being at risk of failing) to satisfy minimum standards, under a performance standards
regime. However, during the period analyzed in California, as it was explained in footnote 5, there
were no performance pressures on the counties, due to the rapid decrease in the welfare caseload in
the period. Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that reverse causality of training policies on new
entrants characteristics is not present here.
6 Analysis of results
Table 3 presents the marginal e⁄ects, evaluated at the means of the covariates, from estimating
multinomial logit regressions on the proportions of the three treatments of interest (no training,
LFA training, HCD training).41 The complete model estimated is presented in Appendix Table A2,
while Table 3 presents the variables of interest. All the speci￿cations include controls for average
demographic characteristics, and county and ￿scal year dummies; the standard errors are robust
to heteroskedasticity, and corrected by county/￿scal year clusters.
E⁄ects of changes in the unobservables distribution and budget The characteristics of
the individuals, both observables and unobservables play a role in the determination of the training
policies.42 The proportion of individuals in each cohort (i.e. county/quarter) that are in the bottom
and upper deciles of the pooled unobservables distribution are included as a way of characterizing
the changes in the skill distribution.43 The proportions are expressed as deviation with respect
to the ￿expected￿proportion of 0.10, which should facilitate the interpretation. Models (1) and
(2) make it clear that the unobservables matter in di⁄erent ways for di⁄erent types of training
(the models di⁄er only in the inclusion of an indicator variable for periods after welfare reform).
41When estimating marginal e⁄ects, if the variable is a dummy, the marginal e⁄ects represent the change from 0
to 1 in that variable.
42The coe¢ cients associated to the demographic characteristics of the entrant cohorts are shown in the Appendix
Tables.
43Other deciles were included but did not appear as statistically signi￿cant. Note that the de￿nition of deciles is
not cohort-speci￿c, but rather from the pooled model used to estimate the unobservables.
22An increase in the proportion of individuals in the lower decile decreases the proportion of LFA
training, and increases that of HCD training (even though the latter e⁄ect is not statistically
signi￿cant), and an increase in the upper decile decreases both types of training. As a reference,
to better interpret the results, consider the e⁄ects of the changes in the unobservables distribution
depicted in Figure 4. The proportion of individuals in the upper decile decreased from 0.111 in
1994 to 0.088 in 1999, for a net change of -0.023. The coe¢ cient for the 90th percentile for LFA in
Model 2 (-0.833) implies that for every 0.01 decrease in the proportion of individuals in the 90th
percentile, LFA training will increase by 0.0083. Thus, the observed changes in the upper part
of the unobservables distributions would explain an increase of ￿0:023 ￿ ￿0:0833 = 0:019 in the
proportion of LFA training (or close to 5% of the total change in the period from 0.11 to 0.53).
The same type of calculation for HCD training shows that the compression of the upper part of
the unobservables distribution accounts for an increase of 0.013 (around 14% of the change in HCD
training in the period). Referring to the six possible cases presented in Figure 2, and to the testable
implications from the returns-maximization model, the results from Model (1) and (2) suggest that
Case 6 is the empirically relevant one, with HCD training being o⁄ered to the lower portion of the
distribution, while LFA is o⁄ered to the middle part and no training is o⁄ered to the upper portion
of the skills distribution.
The e⁄ects of an increased budget, as measured by per capita expenditures, also goes in the
direction predicted by the model; it increases HCD training and decreases no training. The expected
sign of the e⁄ect on LFA training was ambiguous; the empirical result is positive. Note that the
average total budget increases modestly in the period (around 10% from 1994 to 1999), but because
of the large decrease in caseload, the per capita resources almost doubled. The results in Model (2)
suggest that those changes explain around half of the overall change in LFA training and around
two-thirds of the change in HCD training in the period.
Model (3) interacts the expenditures variable with the unobservables measures, with the results
showing an even larger e⁄ect of the changes in unobservables in the upper part of the distribution,
when the budget is higher.
E⁄ects of local economic conditions To capture local economic conditions, several variables
were considered. Unemployment rates appear as statistically signi￿cant, as well as employment
and earnings in the service sector, which have been used previously to capture county-level labor
market conditions (e.g., Hoynes, 2000). Retail sector variables showed similar e⁄ects, which should
not come as a surprise given that retail is one of the more important sectors for low wage workers,
and therefore is the sector where welfare recipients would most likely try to obtain jobs. However,
they were dropped due to high correlation with the service sector variables.
Interestingly, increases in unemployment rates have a marginally statistically signi￿cant negative
e⁄ect on the proportion of HCD training, which is not consistent with the idea that when the outside
23option gets worse, the implicit time cost of HCD training decreases. The increase in LFA training
associated with higher employment rates is intuitive: when the markets are demanding workers, it
is easier to implement the LFA approach.
E⁄ects of the local political environment The results in Table 3 appear consistent with the
testable implications of the returns-maximization model. However, as it was discussed in Section
3.2, they may also be compatible with models in which the welfare agency administrators exhibit
moderate preferences for a particular type of training or moderate inequality aversion. Adding
measures of the local political environment could capture these types of preferences.
Table 4 shows the marginal e⁄ects from regressions similar to the ones presented in Table 3
(see the regressions in Appendix Table A3), but adds information on the party composition of the
county Boards of Supervisors. Two di⁄erent measures are considered. The ￿rst one just measures
if the Board has a Democratic majority (at least 3 out of 5 members). To understand the variation
captured with this variable, Figure 5 presents all the counties in the study, every year (weighted by
size), according to whether the Board had a Democratic or Republican majority in 1994. Changes
in the following years from the left to the right of each graph (or vice versa) signify a Board that
has changed the majority party. Around 30% of the counties/years show this type of changes,
providing a key source of exogenous variation to identify the e⁄ects of changes in the local political
environment. In addition, Figure 6 represents the same data as in Figure 1, but now classi￿ed by
whether the Board has a Democratic or Republican majority. It is clear from the picture, that the
increase across the board in training has not occurred in the same way for all counties, with a clear
trend of Democratic counties moving towards a higher proportion of HCD training (compared to
Republican counties), while increasing LFA training at the same time.
This is con￿rmed by the regressions in Table 4, Models (1) to (3), which show that a change of
a Board from Republican to Democratic increases the proportion of HCD training by around 0.03.
This is a large e⁄ect, considering that the average proportion of HCD training for the period is
0.09. The e⁄ects of budget and local economic conditions are not a⁄ected by the inclusion of this
political variable. Regarding the e⁄ects of changes in the unobservables distribution, Models (1)
and (2) suggest that once the political environment is taken into account, changes in the upper part
of the unobservables distribution are the only ones that matter (in the same direction as before).
Model (3) interacts the political variable with the unobservables variables. The results for the
interaction of a Democratic Board with the 10th percentile are very interesting; the negative sign
for no training and positive sign for LFA training (both signi￿cant) suggest that the compression
in the lower part of the unobservables distribution increases no training and reduces LFA training.
However, it is puzzling that this is not re￿ ected in an (marginal) increase in HCD training.
Finally, Model (4) in Table 4 considers the case where the Democratic majority variable is
divided in two: ￿ weak￿and ￿ strong￿majority (3 out of 5 supervisors and 4 or 5 out of 5 respectively).
24Interestingly, going from a ￿ weak￿Democratic majority to a Republican majority generates a similar
reduction in HCD training as before (0.028). However, if a ￿ strong￿Democratic county switches to
Republican, then the negative e⁄ect on HCD is more than doubled, to 0.062. This is consistent with
a political economy model where a strong majority can push policies in their preferred direction to
a larger extent than a weak majority.
A ￿ner classi￿cation of HCD programs One of the issues raised by the recent literature
evaluating the e⁄ects of WTW programs is the need to better account for the heterogeneity of
actual services received within broad training categories (e.g., Dyke et al., 2006). To explore this
issue, I divided the HCD types of training into its two components: 1) adult basic education (ABE),
which include ESL and GED courses, as well as adult basic education; and 2) vocational education
training (VOC), which includes courses at community colleges and oriented to a trade profession.
Table 5 presents the marginal e⁄ects from running a multinomial logit model with four cate-
gories, instead of three, for the two sets of political variables explored (the regression results are
presented in Appendix Table A4). Analyzing Model (2) it is interesting to note that the variable
Democratic majority seems to a⁄ect almost equally the proportions of ABE and VOC training. On
the other hand, expenditures and local economic conditions a⁄ect only VOC, not ABE. The e⁄ects
of changes in the upper part of the unobservables distribution are similar as before; in the lower
part, however, it appears to have an interesting positive e⁄ect on ABE, but not on VOC. This is
consistent with the ABE services being o⁄ered to the individuals with the lowest level of initial
skills, and con￿rms that Case 6 of the model in Section 3 is probably an adequate representation
of the types of individuals receiving each type of treatment. Finally, the same basic pattern of
results emerge from Model (3), when considering ￿ weak￿and ￿ strong￿Democratic majorities. For
both types of majorities, there is a large and signi￿cant e⁄ect on the proportion of VOC training;
for ABE training, however, the e⁄ect is signi￿cant only for a ￿ weak￿majority.
Summary It is clear that the political environment of the county, as measured by the party
composition of the Board of Supervisors, has a large positive e⁄ect on the proportion of welfare
recipients that receive HCD training. The same is true for the components of HCD training, adult
basic education and vocational education. Moreover, the stronger the Democratic majority in
a board of supervisors, the larger is the positive e⁄ect on those types of training. In addition,
the results associated to the measures of the unobservables distribution allow identifying the type
of individuals (as characterized by unobservables) that receive alternative treatments. The results
suggest that lower-skilled (unobservables) individuals are o⁄ered HCD training, while middle-skilled
individuals are o⁄ered LFA training. The highest-skilled individuals are those not o⁄ered training.
This is probably consistent with a ￿work-￿rst￿approach where the objective is to o⁄er the least
amount of training possible, such that individuals can obtain a job as quickly as possible.
257 Conclusion
I model the training assignment problem faced by county welfare agencies and consider alternative
assumptions about the objective function of the agencies when assigning welfare participants to
di⁄erent types of training. I derive empirical implications regarding aggregate training policies, and
test them using data for Welfare-to-Work training programs run by California￿ s counties during the
1990s. Overall, my ￿ndings are that counties determine their training policies based on resource
constraints, labor market conditions, and the characteristics of the individuals to be served in
ways that appear to be consistent with a simple returns-maximization model. However, when
incorporating the e⁄ects of local political factors, I ￿nd that a simple returns-maximization model
is not su¢ cient to characterize the observed assignment decisions of county welfare agencies. In
particular, I ￿nd that switching from a Republican to a Democratic majority in the county Board
of Supervisors has a strong e⁄ect on training policies, signi￿cantly increasing the proportion of
welfare recipients receiving human capital development training.
These results are important for two reasons. First, they underscore the need to properly take
into account the complex interaction between the many agents involved in the determination of
training policies and the political environment. The period analyzed was mostly devoid of perfor-
mance standards pressure, but the most recent policy emphasis has been on imposing performance
standards on Welfare-to-Work programs. As Fording et al. (2006) show, di⁄erences in the local
political environment can a⁄ect the way in which performance standards systems operate. Thus,
identifying and recognizing the presence of local political factors when devising performance stan-
dard systems may be of utmost importance to attain the desired performance objectives.
Second, and more importantly, the results raise e¢ ciency concerns about the assignment-to-
training policies. There seems to be an emerging consensus in the literature that human capital
development programs are preferred in the long-run over labor force attachment programs (e.g.
Hotz et al., 2006; Dyke et al., 2006). Thus, if HCD programs are less favored by Republican-
leaning counties, this could have important negative consequences for the long-run outcomes of
the welfare recipients living in those areas. Given these potential e¢ ciency costs, future research
should attempt to understand the mechanisms behind the political process that gives rise to the
assignment to training decisions, with the objective of ￿nding ways of minimizing e¢ ciency losses.
.
26Appendix
Assumptions to obtain (P1) The following are the assumptions necessary to obtain (P1).
Assumption 1
The outcome generating functions Y





iii) strictly increasing: Y
i
￿ > 0 for all ￿ 2 [￿;￿]
iv) bounded from below and above: Y
i(￿) ￿ 0 and Y
i(￿) < K; where the constant K < 1.
Assumption 1 implies that there are always positive but decreasing returns to skills for any treatment and that
the problem will be well speci￿ed. Note that with Y
N concave, it is su¢ cient that the treatment e⁄ects ￿
L and ￿
H
are concave, to have outcome functions Y
L and Y
H that are concave.
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Assumption 2















￿ 8￿, i;j;k = N;L;H, i 6= j 6= k:
Assumption 2 has a clear economic interpretation: if a particular treatment is better for individuals of higher
skills, then the marginal returns to skills are also higher for these individuals. This is a standard single crossing
property, and is crucial to be able to simplify the decision problem of the county.
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Assumption 3
The cumulative distribution function of ￿ is di⁄erentiable and strictly increasing in ￿: F￿(￿) ￿ f(￿) > 0; for
￿ 2 [￿;￿]:
Assumption 3 guarantees that there are no regions of ￿ in which the density function is not de￿ned, and it is
necessary to assure that the ￿rst order conditions of the problem are well de￿ned.
It is straightforward to prove that under Assumptions 1 and 3 a solution always exists.
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First order conditions for (P1) The ￿rst order necessary conditions for (P1) (using a Lagrange multiplier
￿ for the budget constraint) are the following:
￿l : [V
l(￿l) ￿ cl]f(￿l) ￿ [V
m(￿l) ￿ cm]f(￿l) + ￿f(￿l)(cm ￿ cl) ￿ 0
￿h : [V
m(￿h) ￿ cm]f(￿h) ￿ [V
h(￿h) ￿ ch]f(￿h) + ￿f(￿h)(ch ￿ cm) ￿ 0 (A1)
￿ : B + F(￿l)(cm ￿ cl) + F(￿h)(ch ￿ cm) ￿ ch ￿ 0:
When the budget constraint is binding, it is easy to show that the county will choose the ￿l and ￿h that satisfy



















That is, the treatment regions are chosen in a way that equalizes the ratio of marginal bene￿ts to the ratio of marginal
costs of the treatments across regions.

















45This condition is analog to what is known in the incentives literature as ￿Spence-Mirrlees￿condition or ￿constant
sign￿condition (see for example SalaniØ, 1997, pp. 31).
46Assumptions 1 and 3 guarantee that the objective function W is continuous and that the budget set is compact.
27Second order conditions for (P1) The second order conditions that need to be satis￿ed around a maxi-




























5 > 0 (A3)



















































> 0. Therefore, the su¢ cient conditions for the critical values


























and will always be satis￿ed because under Assumption 2 V
h
￿ (￿h) > V
m
￿ (￿h) and V
m
￿ (￿l) > V
l
￿(￿l).￿
Necessary conditions for interior solutions to (P1) The following conditions are necessary for an
￿interior solution￿of (P1) in which all three treatments l;m and h (in ascending order of the distribution of ￿) are
o⁄ered:
i) V
l(￿) ￿ cl > V
m(￿) ￿ cm > V
h(￿) ￿ ch;
ii) V
l(￿) ￿ cl < V
m(￿) ￿ cm < V
h(￿) ￿ ch;
iii) V
h(￿l) ￿ ch < V
l(￿
￿
l ) ￿ cl:
iv) V
h(￿l) ￿ ch < V
m(￿
￿
l ) ￿ cm:￿
Changes in budget The following proposition indicates the e⁄ects of changes in available budget to the county,
B, on PN;PL and PH:
Proposition 1 If the budget B increases then:
a) the total proportion of people not trained, PN, decreases;
b) the proportion of people receiving training H, PH, increases;
c) the change in the proportion of people receiving training L, PL, is ambiguous in Case 1 and Case 6, negative in
Case 3 and Case 5, and positive in Case 2 and Case 4.












￿2(￿l;￿h;B;￿;￿) = B + F(￿l;￿)(cm ￿ cl) + F(￿h;￿)(ch ￿ cm) ￿ ch = 0: (A6)
Di⁄erentiating (A5) and (A6) with respect to ￿l;￿h and B, and reordering terms, the following system needs to be


















































f(￿h)(ch ￿ cm) +
V
h




f(￿l)(cm ￿ cl): (A10)
The sign of this determinant is key to evaluate the e⁄ects of changes in B, and it will depend on the particular case
under which the county is operating. Because of Assumption 2 it always holds that V
m
￿ (￿l) ￿ V
l
￿(￿l) > 0 and that
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h
￿ (￿h) ￿ V
m
￿ (￿h) > 0. Therefore, the sign of the determinant will depend on the di⁄erences of costs in each case.
Given that cH > cL > cN, it is easy to see that under Case 1 ch > cm > cl; under Case 2 and Case 4 cm > cl and
ch < cm; under Case 3 and Case 5 cm < cl and ch > cm; and under Case 6 ch < cm < cl. In this way det(A) will be
positive in Cases 1 and 6, and negative in Cases 2, 3, 4, and 5.

























where, given the sign of the cost di⁄erences and of det(A) in each case, it is clear that
@￿l
@B will be negative in Cases
1, 2 and 4, and it will be positive in Cases 3, 5 and 6. Likewise
@￿h
@B will be negative in Cases 1, 3 and 5, and it will
be positive in Cases 2, 4 and 6.
Finally, analyzing for each case Pl; Pm, and Ph, the proportion of individuals receiving treatment l;m; and h






















Using (A11) and (A12) in (A13), (A14) and (A15), it can be seen then that the proportion of people receiving
treatment N will always decrease (i.e. total training will increase) (
@PN
@B < 0 ,
@(PL+PH)
@B > 0), and that the
proportion of people receiving training H will always increase (
@PH
@B > 0). The change in the proportion of people
receiving training L will be negative in Cases 2 and 4 (where training H is o⁄ered to the individuals in the middle of
the distribution of ￿) and positive in Cases 3 and 5 (where treatment N is o⁄ered to the individuals in the middle of
the distribution of ￿). However, it will ambiguous in Cases 1 and 6 (where treatment L is o⁄ered to the individuals






@B (even without taking into









E⁄ects of changes in the opportunity cost of training One can parameterize Y
N with a vector
￿ that measures changes in the outcome generating function under no treatment in two ways: by increasing Y
N in
a constant manner, and by increasing it more for more able individuals. Then, Y
N(￿;￿) = ￿0 + ￿1Y
N(￿), where the
vector ￿ is formed by two elements: ￿0 which implies a parallel translation of the original function Y
N(￿) and ￿1
which implies a proportional increase of the returns to skills. Note that a change in Y
N a⁄ects also Y
L and Y
H (the
outcome under training L and H), but just through the e⁄ect of Y
N. This rules out the possibility that changes in
the economic situation of the county also a⁄ect the treatment e⁄ects ￿
L or ￿
H.
The e⁄ects of a change in ￿0, a parallel translation in Y
N, are speci￿ed in the following proposition, and depend
on a condition that is fully explained below.
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Proposition 2 a) In general the e⁄ects of a parallel translation in the outcome generating function Y
N are ambigu-
ous;
b) If the ratio of the opportunity cost to its direct cost of training H is ￿small enough￿relative to the same ratio for
training L, then an increase in ￿0 will reduce PL and will increase PN and PH:

















where A is de￿ned as in (A8), needs to be solved to obtain the e⁄ects of changes of ￿0 on ￿l and ￿h. Note that
￿m ￿ ￿l ￿ ￿(￿m ￿ ￿l), ￿h ￿ ￿m ￿ ￿(￿h ￿ ￿m), for l;m;h = N;L;H, and ￿N ￿ 0.
48 Then, replacing these terms
47The e⁄ects of a change in ￿1, a proportional translation in Y
N, are the same as the e⁄ects of a change in ￿0:
The proposition proving this, available upon request, is not presented in the interest of space.
48In the case in which the discount factor is not one, the terms will be a little bit di⁄erent, but all the analysis
holds the same. Speci￿cally, with ￿ < 1, ￿m ￿ ￿l ￿ ￿
￿￿m￿￿￿l
1￿￿ , ￿h ￿ ￿m ￿ ￿
￿￿h￿￿￿l
1￿￿ .





























where, by the analysis made in the proof of Proposition 1, det(A) will be positive in Cases 1 and 6 and negative in
Cases 2 through 5. It is clear that the sign of the derivatives will depend crucially on the sign of the term between
square brackets. Each ratio in the bracketed term represents the ratio of relative opportunity costs of two treatments
(the higher ￿, the longer the number of periods in which the individual can not participate in the labor market) versus
the relative direct costs of these two treatments (as cH > cL > cN and ￿H > ￿L > ￿N, the two ratios will be always
positive).
To analyze the changes in the proportions, use expressions analogous to (A13), (A14) and (A15), and introduce











































From (A19), (A20) and (A21), it is clear that each proportion change according to a weight given by the di⁄erence
in direct costs of the other two treatments, times the di⁄erence in ratios of opportunity costs. The sign of these







the bracketed expression will be negative in Cases 1, 2 and 3, and it will be positive in Cases 4, 5 and 6. This implies








This proposition shows that a change in the opportunity cost of training will have two opposite e⁄ects. On one
hand, there is a direct e⁄ect of increasing the cost of no treatment, which implies that PN should always increase.
How PL and PH change is more complex to analyze. Given that the budget is ￿xed and that PN increases, with
everything else equal, the county has now more budget available for the people that are going to be trained. Following
the same logic of Proposition 1, given that training H is always rationed, there should be a substitution of training
L for training H (therefore making PL decrease and PH increase). However, because training H is the training that
takes longer to be completed, the opportunity cost of this training with respect to training N increases more than for
training L, making training H less desirable. If this e⁄ect is big enough, then the substitution will be from training H
to training L, which in turn might even imply (if the savings are big enough, given that training H is more expensive)
that the increase in PL makes PN actually decrease.
E⁄ects of change in skills distribution Let￿ s call ￿ the vector of parameters that de￿ne the distribution
of skills, and represent this distribution as F(￿;￿). Using the de￿nitions of the proportions of individuals receiving
treatment l;m and h, it is easy to see that the e⁄ect on these proportion of a change in ￿ will be composed by two
parts: the change in the optimal ￿l and ￿h because of the distributional change, and the change in the mass of the






















The e⁄ects of a change in ￿ can be analyzed in the same way as with changes in B or ￿0. In particular,














[(cm ￿ cl)F￿(￿l) + (ch ￿ cm)F￿(￿h)]d￿
￿
; (A25)
where A is de￿ned as in (A8), needs to be solved to obtain the e⁄ects of changes of ￿ on ￿l and ￿h. Then, using












[(cm ￿ cl)F￿(￿l) + (ch ￿ cm)F￿(￿h)]: (A27)
The term in the square bracket shows that the interaction of the relative costs of the treatments and the changes in
the mass of the distribution of ￿, will determine the e⁄ect on ￿l and ￿h. However, (A26) and (A27) are not enough to
characterize the e⁄ects of changes in ￿ on the proportions, because as it is shown in (A22), (A23) and (A24), there
will be an extra term, F￿ that will make the ￿nal e⁄ect in most of the cases ambiguous (many of the signs would be
ambiguous even without this extra term).
I make two di⁄erent distributional assumptions. The ￿rst is assume that F(￿) is distributed Uniform (￿;￿), and
de￿ne ￿ ￿ ￿. This implies studying the e⁄ect of the entrance (or exit) of more able individuals (given the properties
of the Uniform distribution, an increase in ￿ imply an increase in both E(￿) and V (￿)). The results are ambiguous in




@￿ are some times positive and some times negative (depending on
the case). This re￿ ects the fact that depending on the (relative) cost of the treatment towards which the distribution
moves, the county would be able to increase the proportion of people receiving that particular treatment. The results
below show that in the cases (except Case 1, ambiguous) in which training L is o⁄ered to individuals of relative less
skills than the ones o⁄ered training H, PL decreases unambiguously if ￿ increases. Intuitively, given that the budget
remains constant, one should think that this would imply a less than proportional increase in PH and an increase in
PN. In the same way, intuition suggests that the opposite e⁄ects should occur for cases in which training L is o⁄ered
to (relatively) more able individuals than individuals o⁄ered training H.
The second assumption is that F(￿) is distributed Normal (￿;￿
2), and ￿ ￿ [￿;￿
2]. Below I show that analyzing
the e⁄ects of changes in ￿ and in ￿
2 gives also ambiguous results. However, because an increase in ￿ with ￿
2 ￿xed
implies that the new distribution stochastically dominates the old one, the intuition would be equivalent to changing
￿ in the Uniform case.





which implies that F￿(￿) = ￿
￿￿￿
(￿￿￿)2 = ￿f(￿)F(￿) < 0 and that
@F￿(￿)
@￿ = ￿f(￿)
2 < 0 (that is, an increase in ￿
implies that the new distribution stochastically dominates the old one, and that the distance between the two cu-
mulative distribution functions increases with ￿). The bracketed term in (A23) and (A24) will be negative in Cases
1 and 3, positive in Cases 4 and 6, and will have an ambiguous sign in Cases 2 and 5, which implies that in Cases
1 and 6
@￿l
@￿ > 0 and
@￿h
@￿ > 0, in Cases 3 and 4
@￿l
@￿ < 0 and
@￿h
@￿ > 0 and in Cases 2 and 5 the derivatives will
have an ambiguous sign. Using (A22), (A23) and (A24), the only unambiguous signs will be
@PL
@￿ < 0 in Cases 3 and 4.
Normal case Assume ￿ is distributed Normal(￿;￿
2), and de￿ne ￿ = [￿;￿
2]. Then for a particular value of









￿ )zdz < 0, where ￿ is the pdf of a standard Normal, and z ￿
￿￿￿
￿ .
Note that although F￿(e ￿) is negative, it will attain a minimum at e ￿ = ￿ and then it will increase asymptotically
towards zero with ￿: Therefore, when evaluating F￿(￿l) and F￿(￿h) in (A22) and (A23), it is not possible to determine
which value is higher. However, still an increase in ￿ implies that the new distribution stochastically dominates the
old one, and intuitively results are similar to changes in ￿ in the Uniform case.
Changes in ￿
















F(e ￿)] Q 0 (it is > 0 when e ￿ < ￿, = 0 when e ￿ = ￿, and < 0 when e ￿ > ￿). Hence, it is not possible to evaluate F￿2(￿l)
versus F￿2(￿h) in (A22) and (A23), given that the position of ￿l and ￿h with respect to ￿ is unknown.￿
31Preference for one type of training The solution to (P2) is similar to the solution to (P1). The ￿rst
order conditions from (P2) are:
￿l : ￿ ￿[V
L(￿l) ￿ V
N(￿l) ￿ cL]f(￿l) + ￿f(￿l)cL ￿ 0 (A28)
￿h :f￿[V
L(￿h) ￿ cL] ￿ (1 ￿ ￿)[V
H(￿h) ￿ cH] + (1 ￿ 2￿)V
N(￿h)gf(￿h)
+ ￿f(￿h)(cH ￿ cL) ￿ 0 (A29)
￿ :B ￿ [F(￿h) ￿ F(￿l)]cL ￿ [1 ￿ F(￿h)]cH ￿ 0: (A30)
Combining (A28) and (A29), and de￿ning a ￿
1￿￿
￿ as the preference factor for training H, the agency chooses ￿l and












That is, as with (P1) the ratio of marginal bene￿ts to marginal costs of each training are equated, but with a weight
factor to bene￿ts given by a. It is easy to see that when ￿ = 1=2 (i.e. there is equal weight given to each type of
training), then a = 1, and (A31) collapses to the optimality condition (A2).
If ￿ is such that an interior solution occurs in which (A31) is satis￿ed, then the empirical implications regarding
budget and opportunity cost of training under (P1) still hold, and empirical implications can be derived for changes
in ￿. For that is necessary that the preference for training L ￿ be in a certain range, as is speci￿ed in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 If the preference for training L is such that ￿ <
V H(￿h)￿V N(￿h)
V H(￿h)+V L(￿h)￿2V N(￿h) then:
a) the results in Proposition 1 hold;








then the results of Proposition 2 hold;
c) an increase in ￿ increases PL and decreases PN and PH:
Proof. The condition ￿ <
V H(￿h)￿V N(￿h)
V H(￿h)+V L(￿h)￿2V N(￿h) is a su¢ cient condition for the second order conditions of






￿ (￿h)] > 0, which is a condition analogous













￿2(￿l;￿h;B;￿0) =B ￿ [F(￿h) ￿ F(￿l)]cL ￿ [1 ￿ F(￿h)]cH = 0: (A33)
Part a) can be proved by di⁄erentiating (A32) and (A33) with respect to ￿l;￿h and B, and reordering terms to

















￿f(￿h)(cH ￿ cL) ￿[aV
H
￿ (￿h) ￿ V
L


















f(￿h)(cH ￿ cL) + [aV
H
￿ (￿h) ￿ V
L
￿ (￿h) ￿ (a ￿ 1)V
N
￿ (￿h)]f(￿l)cL: (A36)
The sign of the determinant in (A36) is positive, and it is straightforward to see that the same results with respect
to changes in B as under (P1) hold (see (A11) through (A15)).
Part b) can be proved by di⁄erentiating (A32) and (A33) with respect to ￿l;￿h and ￿0, and using (A35) and




















cH￿cL and all the results in
(A17) through (A21) hold.
32Finally, part c) of the proposition can be proved by di⁄erentiating (A32) and (A33) with respect to ￿l;￿h and a,




































will be positive and negative respectively. This clearly implies that as a increases PL decreases and PN and PH
increase (see for example (A13)-(A15)). Given that a =
1￿￿
￿ , then ￿ and a will go in opposite directions, and an
increase in ￿ will increase PL and decrease PN and PH.
Objective function with inequality aversion The problem in which the program administrator exhibits
inequality aversion can be expressed using a Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) welfare function for a decision























s:t: F(￿l)cl + [F(￿h) ￿ F(￿l)] cm + [1 ￿ F(￿h)]ch ￿ B;
where " is the inequality aversion parameter. When " = 1 there is no inequality aversion, if " = 0 the utility function
becomes logarithmic and implies unitary inequality aversion, and if " ! ￿1 then the there in￿nite aversion to
inequality and the welfare function becomes Rawlsian where only the welfare of the individual worst o⁄ matters.











which is analogous to the ￿rst order condition of (P1), equation (A2). In fact (P1) is a special case of (P3) when " = 1,
i.e. there is no aversion to inequality. It can be shown that for some low levels of inequality aversion the results of (P1)
will hold, but for higher levels of inequality aversion the results can actually be very di⁄erent. If the ￿rst case occurs,
though, it would not be possible to di⁄erentiate between preferences towards the lower earnings group introduced by
the inequality aversion parameter, from the preferences for a type of training (as in (P2)). If the inequality aversion
is high, then depending which training is more bene￿cial for the lower skills individuals, the results from (P1) could
be even stronger, or could become completely the opposite. In particular, if training H favors lower skills individuals,
the results from (P3) will be similar with respect to changes in budget and local economic conditions to the results from
(P1).￿
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37Table 1. Evolution of county level variables (annual average 25 counties)
Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 /a
Proportion Not Trained 0.796 0.780 0.753 0.685 0.484 0.287
                                         (0.11) (0.13) (0.15) (0.19) (0.26) (0.22)
Proportion Labor Force Attachment (LFA)  Training 0.110 0.143 0.186 0.249 0.406 0.531
                                         (0.07) (0.08) (0.11) (0.14) (0.22) (0.21)
Proportion Human Capital Development (HCD) Training 0.093 0.077 0.061 0.066 0.110 0.182
                                         (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.11) (0.12)
Proportion Adult Basic Education (ABE) Training 0.064 0.054 0.039 0.037 0.038 0.055
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Proportion Vocational (VOC) Training 0.028 0.024 0.021 0.029 0.071 0.128
(0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.08) (0.08)
Total Budget ($ millions) /b 35.11 34.96 35.21 32.90 34.59 38.83
                                         (33.33) (32.71) (33.11) (30.57) (30.71) (33.40)
Training Budget ($ millions) /b 5.17 5.18 5.35 6.05 8.70 11.03
                                         (4.40) (4.31) (4.56) (5.04) (7.52) (8.77)
Training Share of Total Budget 0.174 0.175 0.178 0.212 0.273 0.307
                                         (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Proportion Democratic County Supervisors 0.479 0.451 0.462 0.450 0.451 0.443
(0.28) (0.31) (0.28) (0.23) (0.23) (0.25)
Proportion Democratic Majority Board of Supervisors 0.561 0.602 0.602 0.577 0.579 0.554
(0.50) (0.49) (0.49) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Proportion >= 80% Democratic Supervisors ('strong') 0.125 0.113 0.113 0.060 0.060 0.076
(0.33) (0.32) (0.32) (0.24) (0.24) (0.27)
Proportion = 60% Democratic Supervisors ('weak') 0.436 0.488 0.488 0.517 0.519 0.478
(0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50) (0.50)
Unemployment Rate (%) 9.506 8.732 8.220 7.274 6.919 6.493
(3.46) (3.77) (3.79) (3.75) (3.87) (4.01)
Employment Service Sector/Population  0.166 0.173 0.181 0.243 0.246 0.252
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06)
Average Real Earnings Service Sector/$1,000 8.209 8.355 8.273 8.521 8.759 8.645
(1.65) (1.92) (1.82) (1.63) (1.63) (1.54)
Enrollment Adults in Welfare (AFDC/TANF) 783,671 784,400 751,418 653,554 539,968 462,295
Notes:
Standard deviations between parentheses. Averages and standard deviations are weighted by average county welfare caseload in the period.
/a First two quarters only
/b Budget refers to data on total expenses (not including cash grants) and expenses in training in the welfare program (AFDC/TANF), 
where training refers to both GAIN (1994-1997) and WTW (1998-1999) programs.Table 2. Characteristics new entrants (annual average 25 counties)
Variable 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 /a
Percentage Female Entrants 0.758 0.758 0.747 0.758 0.749 0.757
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05)
Average Age at Entry 27.7 27.0 26.6 26.2 25.8 25.6
(0.94) (0.85) (0.84) (0.83) (0.95) (0.92)
Proportion White 0.339 0.350 0.350 0.355 0.335 0.327
(0.16) (0.15) (0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Proportion Hispanic 0.421 0.399 0.394 0.378 0.373 0.371
(0.17) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
Proportion Black 0.150 0.164 0.173 0.193 0.204 0.211
(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Proportion Other Races 0.089 0.087 0.083 0.075 0.088 0.090
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Average Number of Kids at Entry 1.471 1.390 1.379 1.355 1.331 1.284
(0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Proportion Entrants with Infants at Entry /b 0.216 0.232 0.245 0.267 0.287 0.288
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
Proportion Entrants with Toddlers at Entry /c 0.492 0.477 0.491 0.494 0.488 0.473
(0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04)
Average Quarters Employed 1 Yr before Entry 1.339 1.387 1.415 1.394 1.386 1.458
(0.17) (0.15) (0.16) (0.14) (0.13) (0.13)
Average Quarters Employed 2 Yrs before Entry 1.085 1.425 1.426 1.389 1.335 1.352
(0.37) (0.15) (0.14) (0.12) (0.13) (0.15)
Average Quarters Employed 3 Yrs before Entry 1.355 0.989 1.280 1.229 1.163 1.160
(0.21) (0.34) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14)
Proportion Never Worked in Yrs 1 to 3 before Entry 0.343 0.339 0.331 0.335 0.332 0.316
(0.06) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04)
Average Real Earnings 1 Yr before Entry/$1000 3.843 3.885 3.819 3.568 3.431 3.635
(0.54) (0.46) (0.51) (0.44) (0.48) (0.52)
Average Real Earnings 2 Yrs before Entry/$1000 3.692 4.819 4.563 4.135 3.743 3.747
(1.28) (0.55) (0.54) (0.47) (0.54) (0.62)
Average Real Earnings 3 Yrs before Entry/$1000 5.107 3.620 4.511 4.019 3.490 3.950
(1.00) (1.35) (0.60) (0.51) (0.54) (2.65)
Number of Entrants 122,288 100,412 84,188 63,492 54,434 24,822
Notes: 
Standard deviations between parentheses. 
Averages and standard deviations are weighted by average county welfare caseload in the period.
/a First two quarters only
/b Infant=less than 1 year old
/c Toddler=1-5 years oldTable 3. Marginal Effects for proportions training types as functions of individual variables, local economic conditions and expenditures
Variable
NT LFA HCD NT LFA HCD NT LFA HCD
Log(Per Capita Expenditures) -0.349*** 0.278*** 0.071** -0.288*** 0.229*** 0.058* -0.280*** 0.225*** 0.055
(0.094) (0.070) (0.032) (0.102) (0.075) (0.035) (0.099) (0.073) (0.034)
Log(Unemployment Rate) 0.106** -0.055 -0.051** 0.108** -0.058 -0.051** 0.100** -0.052 -0.048**
(0.049) (0.037) (0.024) (0.048) (0.036) (0.024) (0.047) (0.036) (0.023)
Log(Employment Service Sector/Population) -0.125* 0.113** 0.013 -0.133* 0.121** 0.013 -0.140** 0.125*** 0.015
(0.071) (0.050) (0.032) (0.070) (0.049) (0.032) (0.069) (0.048) (0.032)
Log(Average Earnings Service Sector) -0.078 0.056 0.022 -0.089 0.065 0.024 -0.090 0.066 0.024
(0.059) (0.044) (0.034) (0.057) (0.040) (0.035) (0.058) (0.041) (0.034)
Proportion in 10th Decile Unobserv. Distrib. - 0.10 0.555* -0.694*** 0.069 0.555** -1.110*** 0.069 0.555 -0.555 0.069
(0.288) (0.219) (0.131) (0.266) (0.211) (0.126) (0.716) (0.648) (0.343)
Proportion in 90th Decile Unobserv. Distrib. - 0.10 1.110*** -1.804*** -0.278* 1.110*** -0.833*** -0.555*** 4.441*** -2.498*** -1.388***
(0.345) (0.264) (0.163) (0.346) (0.263) (0.159) (1.217) (0.911) (0.510)
Dummy CA TANF (CalWORKs) Period  -0.092*** 0.074** 0.019* -0.085*** 0.070** 0.015
(0.033) (0.029) (0.011) (0.033) (0.029) (0.010)
Log(PC Budget) * Prop. 10th Decile Unobs. Dist. 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.623) (0.566) (0.298)
Log(PC Budget) * Prop. 90th Decile Unobs. Dist. 2.220** -1.388 -1.318***
(1.112) (0.855) (0.445)
Observations 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548
Controls for Demographic Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F test Expenditures related terms = 0 (p-value) 0.011 0.012 0.005
F test Unobservables related terms = 0 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.060
Robust standard errors between parentheses (adjusted by county/fiscal year clusters)
*   significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: 
NT    = No Training (average = 0.66)
LFA  = Labor Force Attachament Training (average = 0.25)
HCD = Human Capital Development Training (average = 0.09)
Results show marginal effects evaluated at mean values (except for dummy variables, where effect is change from 0 to 1), based on the results
from running a multinomial logit model on the proportions of each type of training, see model results in Appendix Table A2
All models include average demographic charateristics of the cohorts of welfare entrants (gender, race, age, number and composition of children)
as well as average labor market information before entry (employment and earnings each of the three years prior to welfare entry).
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)Table 4. Marginal Effects for proportions training types including political factors
Variable
NT LFA HCD NT LFA HCD NT LFA HCD NT LFA HCD
Board of Supervisors Democratic (>50%) -0.013 -0.016 0.030*** -0.009 -0.020 0.029*** -0.005 -0.024 0.028**
(0.029) (0.024) (0.011) (0.026) (0.023) (0.011) (0.026) (0.023) (0.012)
Board of Supervisors 'Strong' Democratic (≥80%) -0.045 -0.016 0.062*
(0.055) (0.042) (0.032)
Board of Supervisors 'Weak' Democratic (60%) -0.008 -0.020 0.028**
(0.026) (0.023) (0.011)
Log(Per Capita Expenditures) -0.347*** 0.276*** 0.070** -0.286*** 0.227*** 0.059* -0.289*** 0.229*** 0.059* -0.289*** 0.229*** 0.060*
(0.095) (0.070) (0.032) (0.102) (0.076) (0.035) (0.102) (0.076) (0.035) (0.103) (0.077) (0.035)
Log(Unemployment Rate) 0.107** -0.056 -0.050** 0.109** -0.059 -0.050** 0.107** -0.058 -0.049** 0.114** -0.060* -0.054**
(0.049) (0.038) (0.024) (0.048) (0.037) (0.024) (0.050) (0.037) (0.025) (0.049) (0.036) (0.025)
Log(Employment Service Sector/Population) -0.128* 0.110** 0.018 -0.135* 0.118** 0.018 -0.133* 0.116** 0.017 -0.135* 0.117** 0.018
(0.073) (0.051) (0.032) (0.071) (0.050) (0.032) (0.070) (0.049) (0.031) (0.071) (0.050) (0.032)
Log(Average Earnings Service Sector) -0.080 0.057 0.023 -0.091 0.066 0.025 -0.109* 0.078** 0.031 -0.091 0.065 0.026
(0.060) (0.044) (0.034) (0.058) (0.041) (0.035) (0.058) (0.039) (0.035) (0.058) (0.041) (0.034)
Proportion in 10th Decile Unobserv. Distrib. - 0.10 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.555** -0.833*** 0.069
(0.289) (0.222) (0.129) (0.268) (0.211) (0.125) (0.313) (0.235) (0.148) (0.269) (0.214) (0.125)
Proportion in 90th Decile Unobserv. Distrib. - 0.10 1.665*** -1.527*** -0.486*** 1.665*** -1.527*** -0.139 1.665*** -0.694** -0.208 1.110*** -0.694*** -0.555***
(0.343) (0.263) (0.160) (0.347) (0.264) (0.158) (0.404) (0.292) (0.181) (0.338) (0.260) (0.153)
Dummy CA TANF (CalWORKs) Period  -0.092*** 0.075** 0.017 -0.094*** 0.076*** 0.018 -0.092*** 0.074** 0.018
(0.033) (0.029) (0.011) (0.033) (0.029) (0.011) (0.033) (0.029) (0.011)
Democratic Board * Prop. 10th Decile Unobs. Dist. -1.665*** 0.694** 0.208
(0.432) (0.347) (0.243)
Democratic Board * Prop. 90th Decile Unobs. Dist. 1.340** -0.909* -0.432
(0.641) (0.526) (0.311)
Observations 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548
Controls for Demographic Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F test Democratic Board related terms = 0 (p-value) 0.000 0.046 0.032 0.704 0.669 0.038
F test Unobservables related terms = 0 (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.097
Robust standard errors between parentheses (adjusted by county/fiscal year clusters)
*   significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: 
NT    = No Training (average = 0.66)
LFA  = Labor Force Attachament Training (average = 0.25)
HCD = Human Capital Development Training (average = 0.09)
Results show marginal effects evaluated at mean values (except for dummy variables, where effect is change from 0 to 1), based on the results
from running a multinomial logit model on the proportions of each type of training, see model results in Appendix Table A3
All models include average demographic charateristics of the cohorts of welfare entrants (gender, race, age, number and composition of children)
as well as average labor market information before entry (employment and earnings each of the three years prior to welfare entry).
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3) Model (4)Table 5. Marginal Effects for proportions training types, HCD training components
Variable
NT LFA ABE VOC NT LFA ABE VOC NT LFA ABE VOC
Board of Supervisors Democratic (>50%) -0.015 -0.016 0.015*** 0.015** -0.010 -0.020 0.016*** 0.014**
(0.029) (0.025) (0.006) (0.006) (0.027) (0.023) (0.006) (0.006)
Board of Supervisors 'Strong' Democratic (≥80%) -0.046 -0.013 0.017 0.043**
(0.054) (0.043) (0.013) (0.020)
Board of Supervisors 'Weak' Democratic (60%) -0.009 -0.020 0.015*** 0.014**
(0.026) (0.023) (0.006) (0.006)
Log(Per Capita Expenditures) -0.340*** 0.280*** 0.009 0.051*** -0.283*** 0.230*** 0.009 0.044*** -0.285*** 0.232*** 0.009 0.045***
(0.092) (0.071) (0.020) (0.013) (0.100) (0.077) (0.022) (0.014) (0.101) (0.077) (0.021) (0.014)
Log(Unemployment Rate) 0.098** -0.062* -0.004 -0.031*** 0.100** -0.065* -0.003 -0.031*** 0.105** -0.067* -0.004 -0.035***
(0.048) (0.038) (0.015) (0.010) (0.047) (0.037) (0.015) (0.010) (0.047) (0.036) (0.015) (0.010)
Log(Employment Service Sector/Population) -0.131* 0.109** 0.010 0.012 -0.139** 0.117** 0.011 0.012 -0.140** 0.116** 0.011 0.013
(0.071) (0.052) (0.018) (0.012) (0.069) (0.051) (0.018) (0.012) (0.069) (0.051) (0.018) (0.012)
Log(Average Earnings Service Sector) -0.077 0.056 0.038* -0.017 -0.087 0.064 0.039* -0.015 -0.087 0.063 0.039* -0.015
(0.056) (0.045) (0.022) (0.014) (0.054) (0.041) (0.022) (0.013) (0.054) (0.041) (0.022) (0.013)
Proportion in 10th Decile Unobserv. Distrib. - 0.10 0.555** -0.555** 0.000 0.035 0.555** -0.833*** 0.243*** 0.035 0.000 0.000 0.173** 0.000
(0.280) (0.223) (0.071) (0.069) (0.259) (0.212) (0.070) (0.069) (0.263) (0.217) (0.069) (0.067)
Proportion in 90th Decile Unobserv. Distrib. - 0.10 0.555* -0.555** -0.173** -0.451*** 0.555* -0.833*** -0.173** -0.312*** 1.665*** -1.527*** -0.069 -0.208***
(0.331) (0.268) (0.083) (0.087) (0.334) (0.267) (0.080) (0.083) (0.329) (0.266) (0.082) (0.079)
Dummy CA TANF (CalWORKs) Period  -0.086*** 0.076** 0.000 0.010** -0.086*** 0.075** 0.000 0.011**
(0.033) (0.029) (0.006) (0.005) (0.033) (0.029) (0.006) (0.005)
Observations 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548
Controls for Demographic Characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F test Democratic Board related terms = 0 (p-value) 0.690 0.685 0.033 0.036
Robust standard errors between parentheses (adjusted by county/fiscal year clusters)
*   significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Note: 
NT    = No Training (average = 0.66)
LFA  = Labor Force Attachament Training (average = 0.25)
HCD = Human Capital Development Training (average = 0.09)
ABE = Adult Basic Education Training (average = 0.05)
VOC = Vocational Training (average = 0.04)
Results show marginal effects evaluated at mean values (except for dummy variables, where effect is change from 0 to 1), based on the results
from running a multinomial logit model on the proportions of each type of training, see model results in Appendix Table A4
All models include average demographic charateristics of the cohorts of welfare entrants (gender, race, age, number and composition of children)
as well as average labor market information before entry (employment and earnings each of the three years prior to welfare entry).
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Proportion Training Types by Year and PartyAppendix Table A1. Estimation of unobservables by Heckman Selection Model and by Two-Part Model  
Variable
Employment log(Earnings) Employment Earnings
Age -0.024** 0.240** -0.038** 0.215**
(0.004) (0.004) (0.010) (0.005)
Age squared 0.000 -0.003** 0.000 -0.003**
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Female -0.342** -0.271** -0.626** -0.247**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.021) (0.009)
White -0.090** -0.050** -0.095** -0.004
(0.011) (0.014) (0.029) (0.018)
Hispanic 0.059** 0.038** 0.131** 0.021
(0.012) (0.015) (0.031) (0.019)
Black -0.079** -0.133** -0.096** -0.031
(0.013) (0.016) (0.033) (0.021)
Language: English 0.615** 0.182** 1.040** 0.139**
(0.015) (0.024) (0.035) (0.025)
Language: Spanish 0.654** 0.007 1.079** -0.161**
(0.018) (0.026) (0.045) (0.028)
Single Parent Family 0.014 0.020 0.006
(0.008) (0.020) (0.009)
Received AFDC as a child -0.076** -0.164** -0.129**
(0.007) (0.020) (0.012)
Number of kids in household -0.060** -0.106** 0.006
(0.005) (0.014) (0.006)
Dummy infant in household -0.040** -0.072** -0.024*
(0.008) (0.021) (0.010)
Dummy kids 1-5 yrs old in household -0.165** -0.314** 0.077**
(0.008) (0.022) (0.011)
Dummy kids 6-12 yrs old in household -0.028* -0.092** 0.038**
(0.011) (0.031) (0.014)
Dummy employed one quarter before this period 0.384** 1.011** 0.636** 0.623**
(0.009) (0.021) (0.026) (0.010)
Dummy employed two quarters before this period 0.345** 0.335** 2.472** 0.250**
(0.010) (0.011) (0.025) (0.009)
Dummy employed three quarters before this period 1.397** 0.282** 0.607** 0.194**
(0.009) (0.011) (0.028) (0.010)
Dummy employed four quarters before this period 0.431** 0.370** 0.755** 0.150**
(0.010) (0.010) (0.029) (0.010)
Growth Rate Total Employment/Population 0.083 -0.364 0.868 -0.353*
(0.190) (0.304) (0.263) (0.252)
Growth Rate Empl. Retail Sector/Population 0.227 0.169 -0.201 0.159
(0.276) (0.230) (0.353) (0.053)
Growth Rate Empl. Service Sector/Population -0.162 0.032 0.865 -0.620*
(0.343) (0.058) (0.510) (0.227)
Growth Rate Total Average Real Earnings -0.056 -0.560 -0.221* 0.045
(0.131) (0.384) (0.446) (0.165)
Growth Rate Retail Sector Average Real Earnings -0.117 -0.516* -0.128 0.040
(0.052) (0.204) (0.098) (0.345)
Growth Rate Service Sector Average Real Earnings 0.128 0.004 1.041 0.072
(0.206) (0.147) (0.679) (0.135)
Constant -0.361** -3.834** -0.638** -2.298**
(0.058) (0.068) (0.153) (0.086)




Observations 305,120 156,271 305,120 156,271
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%
Robust standard errors in parentheses
Notes:
All regressions include also county dummies and year/quarter dummies.
The employment and earnings dependent variables refer to two years (quarters 5-8) before first welfare entry.
The first two columns show the results from estimating the two-step Heckman selection model, using log(earnings).
The second two columns show the results from estimating a two-part model with a logit regression for the 
employment equation, and a GLM model with a Gamma function and log link, for the earnings equation (in levels)
Heckman Selection Model Two-Part ModelAppendix Table A2. Multinomial Logit Model for Training Proportion (basis for Table 3)  
Variable
LFA HCD LFA HCD LFA HCD
Log(Per Capita Expenditures) 1.886*** 1.382*** 1.559*** 1.137** 1.524*** 1.077**
(0.468) (0.516) (0.511) (0.564) (0.494) (0.542)
Log(Unemployment Rate) -0.426* -0.792** -0.441* -0.791** -0.403* -0.739**
(0.251) (0.359) (0.245) (0.362) (0.241) (0.346)
Log(Employment Service Sector/Population) 0.742** 0.333 0.795** 0.343 0.824** 0.385
(0.344) (0.489) (0.337) (0.485) (0.333) (0.483)
Log(Average Earnings Service Sector) 0.390 0.380 0.451* 0.425 0.459* 0.431
(0.294) (0.491) (0.273) (0.498) (0.279) (0.495)
Proportion in 10th Decile Unobserv. Distrib. - 0.10 -2.690* 1.072 -1.159 2.006 -4.372 -1.029
(1.488) (1.950) (1.411) (1.848) (4.168) (4.836)
Proportion in 90th Decile Unobserv. Distrib. - 0.10 -8.849*** -7.925*** -7.247*** -6.895*** -18.014*** -24.577***
(1.767) (2.436) (1.769) (2.390) (6.165) (7.711)
Proportion Female -0.435 0.263 1.461 1.565 1.628 1.859
(0.987) (1.343) (1.183) (1.488) (1.185) (1.449)
Proportion White 5.357** 2.063 6.643*** 2.950 5.512*** 0.641
(2.357) (3.153) (2.288) (3.110) (1.918) (2.871)
Proportion Hispanic 3.771* 2.579 5.137** 3.561 4.215** 1.607
(2.115) (2.839) (2.119) (2.768) (1.923) (2.600)
Proportion Black 7.634** -0.101 8.422*** 0.410 7.018*** -2.191
(3.020) (4.652) (2.938) (4.562) (2.633) (4.347)
Average Age 0.173** 0.015 0.214*** 0.043 0.204** 0.030
(0.083) (0.101) (0.082) (0.101) (0.081) (0.104)
Number of Children -1.406** -0.775 -1.391** -0.773 -1.414*** -0.765
(0.572) (0.633) (0.550) (0.627) (0.540) (0.614)
Proportion with Children < 1 year old 3.092** 1.180 2.738** 0.860 2.610** 0.684
(1.339) (1.625) (1.362) (1.678) (1.273) (1.644)
Proportion with Children 1-5 years old -0.787 0.384 -0.611 0.474 -0.607 0.467
(1.229) (1.499) (1.214) (1.500) (1.184) (1.514)
Avg. Employment Year 1 before Welfare Entry 0.362 0.204 0.503 0.265 0.587 0.366
(0.586) (0.822) (0.585) (0.813) (0.598) (0.822)
Avg. Employment Year 2 before Welfare Entry -0.040 -0.603 -0.052 -0.632 -0.157 -0.756
(0.398) (0.576) (0.383) (0.570) (0.392) (0.584)
Avg. Employment Year 3 before Welfare Entry -0.385 -0.597** -0.422 -0.638*** -0.417 -0.650***
(0.257) (0.241) (0.258) (0.240) (0.255) (0.240)
Prop. Never Employed Yrs 1-3 before Welfare Entry -1.275 -4.513*** -0.600 -4.226*** -0.598 -4.237***
(0.959) (1.553) (0.972) (1.522) (0.975) (1.512)
Avg. Earnings Year 1 before Welfare Entry/$1,000 0.072 0.139 0.060 0.129 0.069 0.139
(0.138) (0.188) (0.138) (0.185) (0.137) (0.178)
Avg. Earnings Year 2 before Welfare Entry/$1,000 -0.003 0.069 0.010 0.082 0.047 0.131
(0.106) (0.150) (0.103) (0.149) (0.107) (0.153)
Avg. Earnings Year 3 before Welfare Entry/$1,000 0.093 0.130*** 0.099* 0.137*** 0.090 0.129***
(0.061) (0.047) (0.060) (0.047) (0.059) (0.047)
Dummy CA TANF (CalWORKs) Period  0.470*** 0.356** 0.444*** 0.301**
(0.170) (0.160) (0.169) (0.148)
Log(PC Budget) * Prop. 10th Decile Unobs. Dist. -3.475 -3.280
(3.639) (4.206)
Log(PC Budget) * Prop. 90th Decile Unobs. Dist. -10.643* -17.563***
(5.765) (6.704)
Constant -17.187*** -4.081 -22.403*** -7.202 -21.791*** -5.887
(4.765) (7.439) (5.347) (7.742) (5.217) (7.648)
Observations 548 548 548 548 548 548
Pseudo R-squared
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors between parentheses (adjusted by county/fiscal year clusters)
*   significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
0.136 0.137 0.137Appendix Table A3. Multinomial Model Estimation (basis for Table 4)
Variable
LFA HCD LFA HCD LFA HCD LFA HCD
Board of Supervisors Democratic (>50%) -0.064 0.404** -0.090 0.393** -0.111 0.378**
(0.158) (0.176) (0.149) (0.169) (0.148) (0.174)
Board of Supervisors 'Strong' Democratic (≥80%) -0.017 0.765**
(0.285) (0.330)
Board of Supervisors 'Weak' Democratic (60%) -0.092 0.393**
(0.149) (0.172)
Log(Per Capita Expenditures) 1.874*** 1.371*** 1.545*** 1.139** 1.560*** 1.150** 1.558*** 1.165**
(0.471) (0.512) (0.515) (0.557) (0.513) (0.558) (0.518) (0.560)
Log(Unemployment Rate) -0.430* -0.787** -0.447* -0.784** -0.439* -0.771** -0.460* -0.841**
(0.252) (0.357) (0.247) (0.360) (0.251) (0.370) (0.245) (0.365)
Log(Employment Service Sector/Population) 0.732** 0.400 0.782** 0.410 0.769** 0.404 0.781** 0.416
(0.353) (0.491) (0.345) (0.487) (0.338) (0.477) (0.345) (0.485)
Log(Average Earnings Service Sector) 0.398 0.403 0.458* 0.447 0.545** 0.540 0.452 0.455
(0.297) (0.494) (0.276) (0.501) (0.265) (0.511) (0.276) (0.496)
Proportion in 10th Decile Unobserv. Distrib. - 0.10 -2.676* 1.233 -1.135 2.126 -3.237** -0.109 -1.201 2.024
(1.489) (1.935) (1.409) (1.844) (1.588) (2.197) (1.432) (1.842)
Proportion in 90th Decile Unobserv. Distrib. - 0.10 -8.886*** -7.740*** -7.280*** -6.748*** -4.697** -3.639 -7.231*** -6.676***
(1.765) (2.409) (1.769) (2.364) (1.993) (2.747) (1.748) (2.312)
Proportion Female -0.451 0.362 1.455 1.616 1.503 1.683 1.462 1.624
(0.989) (1.343) (1.184) (1.480) (1.179) (1.476) (1.180) (1.471)
Proportion White 5.421** 1.897 6.722*** 2.749 6.546*** 2.518 6.708*** 2.451
(2.350) (3.182) (2.278) (3.135) (2.189) (3.059) (2.210) (2.927)
Proportion Hispanic 3.810* 2.528 5.185** 3.463 5.141** 3.374 5.181** 3.227
(2.107) (2.849) (2.112) (2.776) (2.042) (2.725) (2.068) (2.620)
Proportion Black 7.675** -0.220 8.475*** 0.271 8.466*** 0.245 8.379*** -0.314
(3.014) (4.680) (2.927) (4.591) (2.881) (4.517) (2.829) (4.351)
Average Age 0.166** 0.023 0.207** 0.049 0.215*** 0.061 0.209** 0.061
(0.083) (0.103) (0.082) (0.103) (0.080) (0.102) (0.083) (0.103)
Number of Children -1.353** -0.819 -1.338** -0.816 -1.285** -0.774 -1.332** -0.825
(0.568) (0.648) (0.544) (0.643) (0.536) (0.636) (0.540) (0.641)
Proportion with Children < 1 year old 3.049** 1.269 2.693** 0.952 2.488* 0.764 2.675** 0.932
(1.341) (1.624) (1.365) (1.675) (1.387) (1.693) (1.364) (1.675)
Proportion with Children 1-5 years old -0.882 0.610 -0.712 0.692 -0.971 0.450 -0.750 0.627
(1.228) (1.512) (1.211) (1.513) (1.204) (1.538) (1.211) (1.523)
Avg. Employment Year 1 before Welfare Entry 0.373 0.209 0.514 0.270 0.315 0.049 0.492 0.191
(0.586) (0.815) (0.585) (0.807) (0.585) (0.788) (0.584) (0.798)
Avg. Employment Year 2 before Welfare Entry -0.020 -0.665 -0.028 -0.693 0.104 -0.525 -0.013 -0.630
(0.399) (0.564) (0.383) (0.558) (0.386) (0.579) (0.382) (0.559)
Avg. Employment Year 3 before Welfare Entry -0.382 -0.602** -0.419 -0.643*** -0.381 -0.602** -0.405 -0.623***
(0.257) (0.239) (0.258) (0.238) (0.259) (0.240) (0.256) (0.236)
Prop. Never Employed Yrs 1-3 before Welfare Entry -1.210 -4.641*** -0.524 -4.363*** -0.685 -4.526*** -0.541 -4.417***
(0.943) (1.544) (0.952) (1.516) (0.930) (1.513) (0.953) (1.530)
Avg. Earnings Year 1 before Welfare Entry/$1,000 0.071 0.126 0.059 0.116 0.083 0.143 0.063 0.132
(0.138) (0.188) (0.137) (0.185) (0.137) (0.179) (0.136) (0.181)
Avg. Earnings Year 2 before Welfare Entry/$1,000 -0.007 0.082 0.006 0.095 -0.018 0.063 0.002 0.082
(0.106) (0.148) (0.103) (0.147) (0.104) (0.151) (0.103) (0.148)
Avg. Earnings Year 3 before Welfare Entry/$1,000 0.094 0.129*** 0.100* 0.136*** 0.098 0.134*** 0.096 0.131***
(0.061) (0.047) (0.060) (0.047) (0.061) (0.047) (0.060) (0.046)
Dummy CA TANF (CalWORKs) Period  0.474*** 0.340** 0.484*** 0.347** 0.473*** 0.344**
(0.170) (0.156) (0.167) (0.158) (0.170) (0.156)
Democratic Board * Prop. 10th Decile Unobs. Dist. 4.692** 4.771
(2.264) (3.462)
Democratic Board * Prop. 90th Decile Unobs. Dist. -6.452* -7.333
(3.479) (4.550)
Constant -16.926*** -5.499 -22.102*** -8.484 -22.035*** -8.581 -22.101*** -8.682
(4.953) (7.559) (5.502) (7.831) (5.501) (7.769) (5.562) (7.859)
Observations 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548
Pseudo R-squared
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors between parentheses (adjusted by county/fiscal year clusters)
*   significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Model (4)
0.137
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
0.136 0.137 0.137Appendix Table A4. Multinomial Model Estimation (basis for Table 5)
Variable
LFA ABE VOC LFA ABE VOC LFA ABE VOC
Board of Supervisors Democratic (>50%) -0.058 0.404** 0.494** -0.086 0.401** 0.469**
(0.161) (0.163) (0.215) (0.150) (0.160) (0.205)
Board of Supervisors 'Strong' Democratic (≥80%) -0.001 0.478 1.115***
(0.286) (0.309) (0.380)
Board of Supervisors 'Weak' Democratic (60%) -0.087 0.400** 0.482**
(0.150) (0.160) (0.209)
Log(Per Capita Expenditures) 1.869*** 0.692 2.051*** 1.544*** 0.602 1.762*** 1.557*** 0.612 1.781***
(0.470) (0.567) (0.490) (0.513) (0.625) (0.534) (0.516) (0.624) (0.538)
Log(Unemployment Rate) -0.447* -0.233 -1.102*** -0.466* -0.218 -1.105*** -0.480** -0.231 -1.216***
(0.251) (0.395) (0.353) (0.245) (0.404) (0.353) (0.242) (0.408) (0.355)
Log(Employment Service Sector/Population) 0.727** 0.422 0.536 0.777** 0.445 0.551 0.778** 0.447 0.596
(0.353) (0.517) (0.458) (0.345) (0.509) (0.452) (0.344) (0.508) (0.449)
Log(Average Earnings Service Sector) 0.384 1.024* -0.417 0.442 1.062* -0.357 0.436 1.058* -0.338
(0.293) (0.579) (0.447) (0.272) (0.583) (0.444) (0.273) (0.583) (0.432)
Proportion in 10th Decile Unobserv. Distrib. - 0.10 -2.658* 1.872 0.339 -1.125 2.308 1.680 -1.198 2.263 1.585
(1.486) (1.955) (2.357) (1.405) (1.889) (2.304) (1.428) (1.890) (2.265)
Proportion in 90th Decile Unobserv. Distrib. - 0.10 -8.940*** -4.962** -11.155*** -7.343*** -4.516** -9.740*** -7.282*** -4.477* -9.779***
(1.771) (2.336) (2.882) (1.773) (2.299) (2.781) (1.752) (2.286) (2.688)
Proportion Female -0.428 2.048 -1.353 1.458 2.652* 0.292 1.468 2.652* 0.300
(0.995) (1.321) (1.540) (1.184) (1.436) (1.678) (1.179) (1.433) (1.656)
Proportion White 5.334** 3.958* 0.029 6.624*** 4.275* 1.216 6.600*** 4.258* 0.536
(2.352) (2.388) (4.459) (2.276) (2.379) (4.337) (2.203) (2.324) (4.054)
Proportion Hispanic 3.777* 5.194** 0.400 5.137** 5.511** 1.703 5.120** 5.500** 1.225
(2.121) (2.256) (4.108) (2.123) (2.260) (3.965) (2.073) (2.219) (3.748)
Proportion Black 7.645** -0.317 -1.425 8.447*** -0.170 -0.734 8.329*** -0.263 -1.763
(3.026) (3.981) (6.574) (2.936) (3.969) (6.466) (2.838) (3.812) (6.221)
Average Age 0.169** -0.090 0.076 0.210*** -0.082 0.110 0.212** -0.080 0.138
(0.083) (0.106) (0.110) (0.081) (0.105) (0.108) (0.083) (0.105) (0.110)
Number of Children -1.373** -0.559 -1.206* -1.358** -0.548 -1.197* -1.350** -0.545 -1.263*
(0.571) (0.717) (0.703) (0.546) (0.715) (0.688) (0.541) (0.715) (0.684)
Proportion with Children < 1 year old 3.089** 1.018 1.193 2.734** 0.859 0.856 2.716** 0.846 0.839
(1.350) (1.702) (2.034) (1.376) (1.737) (2.110) (1.375) (1.736) (2.107)
Proportion with Children 1-5 years old -0.837 0.675 0.988 -0.664 0.691 1.084 -0.702 0.658 1.095
(1.225) (1.547) (1.770) (1.207) (1.558) (1.756) (1.207) (1.564) (1.762)
Avg. Employment Year 1 before Welfare Entry 0.386 -0.784 0.760 0.529 -0.774 0.854 0.506 -0.795 0.637
(0.584) (0.883) (0.814) (0.582) (0.878) (0.810) (0.582) (0.876) (0.785)
Avg. Employment Year 2 before Welfare Entry -0.029 -0.506 -0.972** -0.034 -0.513 -0.972** -0.016 -0.500 -0.858*
(0.399) (0.710) (0.484) (0.384) (0.702) (0.477) (0.383) (0.703) (0.479)
Avg. Employment Year 3 before Welfare Entry -0.384 -0.567** -0.610** -0.419 -0.595** -0.658*** -0.405 -0.583** -0.635***
(0.255) (0.253) (0.242) (0.255) (0.252) (0.242) (0.254) (0.250) (0.238)
Prop. Never Employed Yrs 1-3 before Welfare Entry -1.220 -4.269*** -5.221*** -0.533 -4.112** -4.710*** -0.550 -4.124** -4.922***
(0.952) (1.653) (1.859) (0.961) (1.640) (1.807) (0.962) (1.641) (1.833)
Avg. Earnings Year 1 before Welfare Entry/$1,000 0.072 0.286 -0.057 0.061 0.284 -0.063 0.065 0.287 -0.026
(0.137) (0.188) (0.214) (0.136) (0.184) (0.210) (0.135) (0.183) (0.200)
Avg. Earnings Year 2 before Welfare Entry/$1,000 -0.006 0.043 0.177 0.006 0.050 0.183 0.002 0.047 0.160
(0.106) (0.185) (0.134) (0.103) (0.182) (0.135) (0.103) (0.183) (0.136)
Avg. Earnings Year 3 before Welfare Entry/$1,000 0.095 0.129** 0.127*** 0.100* 0.136*** 0.132*** 0.097 0.133*** 0.127***
(0.061) (0.050) (0.044) (0.060) (0.050) (0.043) (0.059) (0.050) (0.043)
Dummy CA TANF (CalWORKs) Period  0.467*** 0.131 0.419*** 0.465*** 0.129 0.430***
(0.169) (0.174) (0.161) (0.169) (0.174) (0.163)
Constant -16.911*** -10.843* -1.680 -22.013*** -10.746 -6.864 -22.026*** -10.782 -7.689
(4.829) (6.469) (8.932) (5.483) (7.134) (9.256) (5.546) (7.141) (9.228)
Observations 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548 548
Pseudo R-squared
County Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fiscal Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors between parentheses (adjusted by county/fiscal year clusters)
*   significant at 10%; **  significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
0.137 0.137 0.137
Model (1) Model (2) Model (3)
HCD HCD HCD